Mohammed Abed

Department of Philosophy, University of Wisconsin-Madison

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I am in the final months of my graduate studies in Philosophy at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. I work in Ethics and Political Theory, although I have studied and have an interest in various issues in Philosophy of Science, Philosophy of Mind, and the rationalist tradition in Islamic Philosophical thought. My PhD dissertation, which continues the work I've done on political violence, is a study of suicide bombing and ethics of self-sacrifice.  You may view my CV here.
 
SCHOLARLY INTERESTS AND BACKGROUND
 
I am due to defend my dissertation in the Fall of 2007. My dissertation work has been directed by Claudia Card, Emma Goldman Professor of Philosophy at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. I have already published several pieces on political violence and I have a number of papers and reviews forthcoming in 2008, including a chapter in the Oxford University Press Handbook on Genocide. During my career as a graduate student at UW-M, I also presented at APA on several occasions. One of my papers on terrorism was accepted as a Symposium Presentation at APA-Pacific in 2006. I have also written research papers on such topics as biological theories of mental content, psychological interpretation,the metaphysics of self-deception, Kant on radical evil, Maimonides' conception of God, and several essays on the political thought of Hannah Arendt.
 
My dissertation begins by laying the conceptual foundations for a philosophical theory of suicide bombing. I argue that suicide bombing can be made sense of as a form of cooperatively perpetrated political terrorism directed at collective targets. On my view, this 'collective' form of terrorism cannot be defined in the standard philosophical sense, although it can be understood as a phenomenon that conforms to either one of two means-end structures of action. The first of these structures is a non-standard form of coercion while the other counts as a non-coercive form of intimidation that works by instilling in a target population a social-psychological state of 'terror.' I introduce two distinctions, one between the intermediate and ultimate objectives of revolutionary terrorist groups, and the other between the motivations of the immediate perpetrator and the collectively defined ends that the immediate perpetrator's actions contribute to. On the basis of these distinctions, I argue that the means-end structure of 'collective' terrorism is always related to the goal intimidating a target or coercing it in the non-standard sense I identify. One implication of my account is that collective terrorism is far more widespread than has been suggested in the philosophical literature to date. In particular, the distinction between collective terrorism and modern warfare is far from clear. There are strong reasons for thinking that many acts of modern warfare would be more accurately described and categorized as instances of collective terrorism. This conclusion is both conceptually interesting and of great significance to the formulation of more adequate transnational legal instruments and international public policy.

I describe in detail the effects that 'terror' is intended to have on a target population and then contrast these effects with those characteristic of what the political philosopher Hannah Arendt referred to as 'total domination.' Central to this contrast is the argument that insofar 'collective' terrorism aims at recognizably political objectives, it would make little sense for its perpetrators to intend on eliminating the human capacity for spontaneous action or to obliterate the realm of public or private political interaction, as totalitarian regimes often do. 'Collective' terrorism can and does, however, intentionally undermine the capacity for rational deliberation and disfigure its victim's aptitude for moral thought and compassion. Often - though not always - 'collective' terrorism deliberately kills innocent civilians and it always makes instrumental use of ethically significant relationships. Taken together, these factors are sufficient to justify an extremely stringent moral presumption against its use.

Although the intentional psychology of suicide bombing has a great deal in common with that of non-suicidal collective terrorism, it is also significantly more complex. In the case of suicide bombings, the influences on the immediate perpetrator are more varied and the perpetrator's acts are culturally mediated and sanctioned in ways that acts of non-suicidal collective terrorism are not. Suicide bombing, I argue, also has a much richer complement of intermediate goals. The relationship between these goals, the immediate perpetrator's motivations, and the formally defined objectives of a campaign of violence is significantly more elaborate in cases of suicidal collective terrorism. I give an account of these differences, and on that basis develop a theory of suicidal terrorism. I suggest that if this theory is to accommodate the diversity of the phenomena, it must also be conceived of as a collection of models, each of which is a subtle variation on the intentional structures of action previously discussed. I argue that this theory has interesting implications for the moral judgments we make about suicide bombing. In particular, it implies that suicide bombing involves wrong making features that are not shared by non-suicidal forms of collective terrorism. The most significant of these has to do with the way in which these acts are often sanctioned by a community and otherwise culturally mediated. However, I do not think it is possible to arrive at a full moral account of suicide bombing without discussing the harm it does to victims independently of the role this harm plays in the means-end structures of the perpetrator's intentional psychology. I describe these 'accidental' harms in detail and explore whether they have something in common with the harms caused by other forms of political and criminal violence.

Is there something else that makes suicide bombing a more serious moral wrong than non-suicidal forms of collective terrorism? Does it have some feature that could be considered morally laudable? The answer to these questions depends on the metaphysics and moral status of suicide, and on whether suicide bombing is a form of altruistic action. I argue that although it does count as a form of suicide, this does not make suicide bombing any worse than non-suicidal forms of collective terrorism. There are no "duties to oneself" (Kant) or any other plausible defense of the immorality of suicide. On the basis of empirical accounts of the perpetrators motivations and social context, I argue that suicide bombing is psychologically altruistic but that this makes little difference to its overall comparative moral status. The dissertation concludes by inquiring into the causes of suicidal collective terrorism in specific conflict zones and by suggesting appropriate political remedies.  
 
 
TEACHING
 
While I have been in residence as a Graduate Student at UW-Madison, I was a teaching and research assistant on six occasions. I assisted in the teaching of such courses as History of Ancient Philosophy, Reason in Communication, Contemporary Moral Issues, and Philosophy of Religion. I have also taught my own applied ethics course twice, and I have been an Associate Lecturer in full charge of large undergraduate courses on three occasions.
 
    
PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITIES
 

I am a founding member and the current programming chair of the Society for Arab, Persian, and Islamic Philosophy (SAPIP), an APA affiliated organization that exists to encourage philosophical reflection on issues and concerns that emerge from the history, life, thought, and writings of peoples of Arab, Persian, and Islamic ancestry in the Americas and throughout the world. SAPIP was established in mid-2006 and it hosted two panels at last year's APA Eastern Division Meeting. At APA in 2007, we will again host two panels, the titles of which are "Contemporary Arab Cultural Critique: Debating Islamicization as a Form of Re-Ethnicization of the Mind," and "Philosophical Perspectives on Political Oppression in the Developing World: Responsibility for Justice, Proposals for Redress."

I am also a reviewer for the Journal of Genocide Studies and a member of the APA and the American Association of University Professors. 

 

OTHER STUFF

 

Besides doing philosophy, I read and write about politics and have been involved in various social movements. I've also been into running for a long time. I race distances ranging from 5K to Half-Marathon. I hope to run a Marathon in the near future.