#: 495586 S7/JFK Debate  [POLITICS]
    29-Feb-96  09:09:09
Sb: Prouty Book Critique 1
Fm: D.T. FUHRMANN 71301,527
To: ALL

Repeated requests for a reporting of my past comments related to Mr. 
Prouty's book on Kennedy and Vietnam have not fallen on deaf ears!  But 
when I returned to Mr. Prouty's work, I found myself with more and more 
to say....far more than can fit a single message.  So I'm going to start 
a series of posts, working my way through chapter by chapter.  This is 
admittedly a highly personal and opinionated critique.  Take it for what 
it's worth......<g>

A Highly Personal Critique of Prouty's Book on JFK and Vietnam..

Almost in the first paragraphs of Chapter One Prouty describes a "power 
elite" conspiracy with allusions to the role of the Queen of England and 
the British East India Company as "the structural mechanism of the most 
powerful men on earth."   From this Prouty meanders (without references, 
or any other guideposts to the source of his assertions and opinions) to 
the Vietnam War.  And here he refers to Clark Clifford's autobiography as 
a "source," though only for a quote which he uses as a launching pad for 
more assertions and opinions of his own.  It is instructive, however, to 
look at Prouty's use of Clifford's writing, and Clifford's original 
comments (which can be found, though Prouty fails to cite this, in 
Clifford's book on page 540-541). Prouty quotes Clifford thus:

"With the limitations now placed on our military---no invasion of the north,
no mining of the harbors, no invasion of the sanctuaries---we have no real
plans or chance to win the war."

Does he provide any context or explanation, any background?  No.  But here's
what Clifford actually wrote:

"The Tuesday Lunch on May 21 was grim.  Rusk began by suggesting again 
that we resume bombing up to the 20th parallel, while I continued to 
argue strongly against the expansion of the bombing: "If we escalate 
again," I said, "it will diminish the chance of success in Paris, and it 
would be catastrophic if Paris broke up and we had to go back to a purely 
military policy."

"Why is that so bad?" the President asked.

"It's bad," I replied slowly, "because we will lose more boys than ever 
before and because I don't think we can win the war by military means."

"The President seemed annoyed: "What do you mean?""

"This was neither the ideal time nor the place to open a discussion of such
basic questions, but I no longer had any choice; the dispute with Rusk over
the bombing had forced me into areas of discussion I had originally 
planned to discuss only in private.  I had to reveal the depths of my 
doubts to the President in front of three powerful opponents---Rusk, 
Rostow, and Wheeler [Clifford then quotes from the original memos of the 
meeting]:

"With the limitations now placed on our military, WHICH I DO NOT OPPOSE---no
invasion of the North, no mining of the harbors, no invasion of the
sanctuaries---we have no real plans or chance to win the war. Our hopes must
go with Paris....In the fall of 1967, the North Vietnamese decided that 
their earlier plans were no good.  They put in their stack, that was 
Tet.  They didn't win, but they can control the situation in the South; 
they can hit and run, they can attack the cities, they can control the 
level of casualties.  Now, they have concluded it is a good time to have a 
political settlement.  They can't win the war militarily.  But we can't 
win the war militarily."

"I agree" said President Johnson, turning to General Wheeler for comment.
Quietly, Wheeler said, "I disagree to some extent." Rusk, with greater 
emotion than I had ever seen before, turned toward me: "We sought to keep 
North Vietnam from overtaking South Vietnam with force.  We have 
succeeded. We win when they know they can't win."

"Determined not to yield, I replied [again, quoting directly from the 
memo of the session]:

"Hanoi cannot win the war militarily.---they know that, we know that.  But
that doesn't mean we can win it. If Paris does not come off, we will be back
where we were before.  The CIA says that they are not running out of 
manpower.  They can continue at their present rate indefinitely.  The 
Soviets and Chinese will continue to help them....Can anybody here tell 
me what our plan is if the Paris talks fail? If Paris fails, we have no 
alternative but to turn back to the military---and they have no plan to 
bring it to an end." {SOURCE: Clark Clifford, pp 540-541]

Apparently General Wheeler did not challenge that assertion.  Not only does
Prouty edit Clifford's comments without showing this was done....an
unpardonable error in itself...but he lifts the comment out of context and
uses it for his own purposes.  There is no effort to understand or 
explain the circumstances of Clifford's comments, nor any interest in 
doing so.

Prouty then refers to the Vietnam War between 1945 and 1965 as "actually a
massive series of paramilitary activities under the operational control 
of the CIA." (Page 6). This ignores the reality of a substantial and 
constantly growing US military involvement throughout the 1950s and early 
1960s, an involvement thoroughly documented and described in (among 
others) Ronald Spector's "Advice and Support: The Early Years, 
1941-1960," (USGPO, 1983) written for the Center for Military History; 
"The United States Navy and the Vietnam Conflict," Volumes I & II (USGPO, 
1976 & 1986); and the Pentagon Papers.  One might also examine "The 
History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the 
War in Vietnam" or the relevant CINCPAC Histories for a more accurate 
assessment of the Pentagon's interest in and active role in Southeast 
Asia during the years PRIOR to 1965. Moreover, Prouty does not bother to 
mention Operation Switchback in the early 1960s, when CIA control over 
various covert operations in SVN, as well as paramilitary and Special 
Forces counter-insurgency programs was transferred from CIA to MACV 
control.  And these were only a small portion of the overall US effort in
Vietnam in the early 1960s, the Pentagon's military assistance program 
making up the lion's share of US efforts in Vietnam.

Prouty notes that since WWII, the ability to conduct wars has been 
constrained by the fear of nuclear war. Quite true.  But while 
complaining that our military was not allowed to approach the point of 
precipitating a nuclear conflict, he fails to offer an alternative.

He also reports on meetings and events related to the Teheran Conference, as
well as a variety of events related to the formation of the CIA. He provides
virtually no references or sources for any of this. And although he 
describes events at various conferences (e.g. Cairo and Teheran, p 13f)  
and some meetings in considerable detail, he does not indicate where ANY 
of that detail came from. Not much in the way of citations, references, 
or sources....despite the fact that there is a tremendous amount of 
documentation and literature on these events.  It is Mr. Prouty's 
interpretation of these events which we are being offered, presented as 
incontrovertible (and unverifiable) fact.  The one reference he offers 
(William Gibbons, "The US Government and the Vietnam War, Vol I), is 
presented without page number (it's on page 4 for those who are 
interested).   And again, the point of the quote (an exchange between 
Churchill and FDR) is not to enlighten the reader about the history of 
the Indochina Conflict, it is a springboard to further explicate 
Prouty's theories about colonialism and the significance of the "high 
cabal's" scheme to "stake out claims" to control over the earth's surface 
and resources. For a book on Vietnam, Prouty takes a roundabout way of 
getting to the point.  Then he asks why more hasn't been written about 
this exchange...completely ignoring the massive literature on the Teheran 
Conference, as well as FDR and Churchill's discussion of the Trusteeship 
concept for Indochina....which not even seriously considered much less 
implemented.  Prouty makes a great deal of FDR's comments to Churchill 
regarding the idea of a "Trusteeship" over Indochina (and specifically 
related to Chinese intentions in the region, though Prouty doesn't 
mention this context), something we shall return to later.  to be 
continued........