#: 499669 S7/JFK Debate  [POLITICS]
    07-Mar-96  14:57:33
Sb: Prouty Critique #10
Fm: D.T. FUHRMANN 71301,527
To: ALL

On page 37 Prouty returns to the shipment of arms from Okinawa to Indochina,
describing how in 1953 Indochina was "freeing itself from Japanese 
occupation and French control and appeared' to be threatened by 
Communists, so it was ripe for the application of the tactics of the 
CIA's invisible war."

By 1953, of course, the Japanese were long gone from Indochina, and the
French....contrary to persistent US advice during the 1940s to deal honestly
with Vietnamese nationalists....were bogged down in a nasty little war 
with an increasingly powerful Viet Minh. Moreover, from late 1949 onward, 
the USG had been actively supporting the French war against the Viet Minh 
with military and economic assistance [cf. Spector, "Advice and Support: 
The US Army in Vietnam, the Early Years, 1941-1960,"  Center for Military 
History, USGPO, 1988,  or Gibbons, "The United States Government and the 
Vietnam War," Vol I].

Indochina only "appeared" to be threatened by Communists?  Yes, if we are to
accept Mr, Prouty, the Viet Minh movement, Ho Chi Minh, Giap, Pham Van Dong,
and all the rest, were nothing more than the creation of the CIA. If the CIA
hadn't been there from the start, there would never have been a war of
nationalist liberation in Indochina.  That does seem to be what Mr. 
Prouty is saying here.  This would appear to ignore the reality of 
Indochinese history during the 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s [cf. David Marr, 
"1945," passim].  In any case, Mr. Prouty sees no need to mention or 
refer us to anything which would provide background or historical 
information on the origins of the Viet Minh, or the history of the French 
war in Indochina during the late 1940s and early 1950s.   Further:

"The inconclusive Korean War had ground to a halt.  The battleground of the
Cold War was being moved from one region to another." (p 37)

Not that the focus of American anti-Communist Containment policy was 
shifting due to changing circumstances in the international environment.  
It was "being moved," as with intent and planning and purpose.

"As we mentioned earlier, more than one-half of all the military 
materiel once stockpiled on Okinawa for the planned invasion of Japan had 
been reloaded in September 1945 and transshipped to Haiphong, the port of 
Hanoi, Vietnam's capital.  This stockpile had amounted to what the army 
called a 145,000 "man-pack" of supplies, that is, enough of everything 
required during combat to arm and supply that many men for war.  Once in 
Haiphong Harbor, this enormous shipment of arms was transferred under the 
direction of Brig. Gen Philip E. Gallagher, who was supporting the OSS, 
and his associate, Ho Chi Minh.  They had come from China to mop up the 
remnants of the defeated Japanese army.  Ho's military commander Col Vo 
Nguyen Giap, quickly moved this equipment into hiding for the day when it 
would be needed." (P 37)

Well, for starters, Mr. Prouty did mention this shipment earlier, but 
not with specific numbers. Half the military materiel stockpiled on 
Okinawa for the invasion of Japan? (Which, according to his earlier 
statement that a similar shipment was sent to Korea, means that ALL of 
the military supplies on Okinawa were moved into Korea and Northern 
Indochina without anyone other than Mr. Prouty and an unidentified dock 
worker being aware of it....and completely without a trace.   Presumably 
this all took place PRIOR to September 16th, 1945, because on that date 
Koumintang Chinese forces occupied northern Indochina, and it is highly 
unlikely they would have remained silent about that much military 
materiel being transferred to the Viet Minh. Moreover, the French 
representative Jean Sainteny, who had arrived in Hanoi with the American 
OSS team from the Theater Headquarters in Chungking, would hardly be 
complacent about such an event. Neither Sainteny nor Archimedes Patti, 
both of whom were there, have reported anything remotely similar to this, 
nor have other historians whether American or otherwise. No doubt Mr. 
Prouty would reject anything Archimedes Patti might say, since he was a 
member of the OSS and therefore is a suspect source.  But Jean Sainteny 
certainly had plenty of complaints about the activities and attitudes of 
the Americans, had no reason to cover up such an event as Prouty is 
claiming, but nonetheless never mentioned anything remotely like this.

There is, however, one even greater problem with this story:

"Despite the tense atmosphere, General Gallagher and his staff proceeded 
with preparations to transport three of the Chinese armies to Formosa and
Manchuria. When a naval task force arrived off the port of Haiphong in
mid-October to load the Chinese, it was discovered that mines sown in the
harbor by the U.S. Army Air Forces during World War II had never been
cleared.[footnote in source text]   Since sweeping the mines would open the
harbor to French troopships and thus possibly lead to war between the French
and the Vietnamese, neither General Gallagher nor General Lu han wanted the
harbor cleared.  The task force commander, Rear Adm. Elliott Buckmaster,
suggested that only the outer approaches to the harbor be cleared and 
that the troops be put abroad from lighters.[footnote in source text]   Using
commandered Japanese minesweepers, Buckmaster completed the task by 22
October, and contingents of the 52d Army began to board seven liberty ships.
Through most of November, General Gallagher and his staff personally
supervised the loading of the troops." [SOURCE: Ronald Spector, "Advice and
Support: The US Army in Vietnam, The Early Years, 1941-1960," Center for
Military History, USGPO, p 68-69]

The harbor at Haiphong wasn't open to shipping; not in September, not in
October, not in November.

Now Mr. Prouty begins to focus more directly on the conflict raging in
Indochina:

"By mid-January 1954, the beleaguered French had 11,000 troops in fifteen
battalions at Dien Bien Phu; the opposing Viet Minh had 24,000 
well-armed men in nineteen battalions. Nevertheless, the National 
Security Council believed this number of the Viet Minh was insufficient 
to take Dien Bien Phu and defeat the French." (P 38)

The French, however, were already considering at least the theoretical
poosibility of having to make a fighting breakout from Dien Bien Phu, and on
January 1, 1954, the French commander in Indochina, General Navarre, wrote:
"with the arrival of new means [from Red China], I can no longer 
guarantee the outcome..." [Bernard Fall, "Hell in a Very Small Place," p 
48].  With regard to the assessment of  the NSC that "the number of Viet 
Minh was insufficient to take Dien Bien Phu and defeat the French," here 
is what the memo of that meeting (which is clearly Mr. Prouty's source 
here, as will be evident) says:

"Mr [Allen] Dulles then briefed the Council on the latest intelligence
regarding the situation at Dien Bien Phu.  There were now 11,000 French 
Union troops in 15 battalions at the base. They had only six days 
supplies of rations.  Nevertheless, unless the Vietminh were able to stop 
the airlift, no difficulties in supply were to be anticipated, and it was 
thought unlikely that the Vietminh anti-aircraft guns could stop this 
airlift. The number of Vietminh troops, said Mr. Dulles, would amount by 
January 15 to some 24,000 in 19 battalions.  It was thought doubtful that 
this was a sufficient number to take Dien Bien Phu in a frontal assault." 
[SOURCE: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, Vol XIII, Pt 
1, "Indochina," p 961-962].

The discerning reader will note that what Dulles said was the Viet Minh 
force was insufficient to take Dien Bien Phu in a frontal assault.  But 
even in his brief statement there was clearly a caveat. If the airlift 
were stopped, the garrison was in trouble. Mr. Prouty reports the basic 
content of the meeting, though he fails to convey the doubts and concern 
among policy makers.

continued in #11........