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#: 318222 S7/JFK Debate  [POLITICS]
    04-Mar-95  17:47:23
Sb: #316952-Prouty's JFK
Fm: D.T. FUHRMANN 71301,527
To: Gerard McNally 73763,436

dtf: > My personal opinion is that Prouty's book is riddled with
inconsistencies, misrepresentations, unsubstantiated speculation and
allegation, and outright inventiveness."

GM: "Again, DTF, a few examples would be welcome!"


INCOMING!!!!!!!

In Chapter One Prouty describes the long-standing "power elite" conspiracy
with allusions to the role of the Queen of England and the British East India
Company.  He brings this theme up at various points during the book. ALthough
he offers no sources, no references, this could be taken directly from Lyndon
Larouche or the John Birch Society texts.  Maybe you find their worldview
convincing.  I don't.  Viva la difference.

Prouty reports on meetings and events related to the Teheran Conference as if
he had been standing there, as well as on a wide range of events related to
the formation of the CIA. He provides virtually no references or sources for
any of this. The few footnotes are either for works he is suggesting (offering
his former boss and mentor's book an military issues as a useful critique of
limited war in the post-nuclear age, but failing to even make note that there
is a huge and varied literature on this very subject which was a significant
element of US policy thinking in the late 50s and early 60s). Or he provides
passing cites to a couple of the non-controversial events (he cites a general
comment from the Teheran Conference once, but while he describes events at
this conference and in other meetings in considerable detail, he does not
indicate where ANY of that detail came from.

Prouty cites Leonard Lewin's book "Report from Iron Mountain," and although he
twice use the word novel related to the book, Prouty treats it as if it were a
valid historical document, at one point stating that the organization which
produced the study "was so highly classified that there is no record, to this
day, of who the men in the group were or with what sectors of government or
private life they were connected." (Page 5). Maybe that's because the book was
a hoax, a work of imaginative fiction (by the admission of Leonard Lewin
himself).  Prouty uses "Report from Iron Mountain" elsewhere to buttress or
support his arguments, and consistently presenting it as a real governmental
or quasi-governmental study. This is scholarship?  Would you accept Herman
Wouk's "Winds of War" as a valid source on World War II?

On page 17 is one of my favorite Proutyisms, and a crucial one it is.  He
reports a personal discussion he had in 1945 with a harbormaster in Okinowa
(unidentified, un-named, unsupported) who reputedly tells our hero that the
shipments of arms and munitions leaving the harbor are on the way to Korea and
Indochina.  This begs the question of whether or not this harbormaster ever
really existed anywhere but in Prouty's imagination (and this story becomes
useful later because he holds it up as the definitive evidence that the USG
intentionally armed the Viet Minh in order to create a war in which the US
could become involved twenty years later).  But even if the harbormaster
existed, what evidence is there to believe that his assertions were accurate?
Maybe he was passing along some of the scuttlebutt and rumor that is the
life-blood of a war zone?  Is there ANYTHING to be found that might
independently corroborate this story---or at least lend it credibility?  Not
that I know of (though Prouty would no doubt shout "AH-HA! at this moment,
preparing the ground for another, more insidious Proutyism---the claim that
only certain people are capable of understanding the truth.  If so, we're all
spinning our wheels in vain.  But he isn't even providing citations so we can
look at the documents he presumably was looking at when he wrote this stuff.

Not only is there nothing to support this story, everything that is known
strongly suggests that the Viet Minh NEVER recieved much in the way of
military support or assistance from anyone until late 1949, when the Chinese
Communist reached the Vietnamese border and began providing the Viet Minh with
equipment captured from the lavishly supplied but not very effective KMT
forces.   The Viet Minh operated almost entirely with a variety of old and
incompatible arms captured from the Japanese and the French.   As the war went
on, they captured increasing amounts of material from the French---who were
also using a lot of old US war surplus.  In none of the French or European
written histories of the French War (several of which are extremely critical
of the largely inadvertent but nonetheless crucial POLITICAL role played by
the OSS in 1945---basically they were used by the Vietnamese, who were able to
capitalize on the American's inherent dislike and distrust of French
intentions) there is no mention of any major US arms shipped to the Viet Minh.
Is it conceiveable that no one in France or Britain would say anything about
such massive US assistance going to the Viet Minh? In fact, I have never run
across ANYTHING in the historical and documentary record which would provide
even a hint of substantiation to this particular chestnut. But Prouty not only
makes the unequivocal assertion, he later uses his own testimony as supporting
evidence that these things did indeed happen. Good scholarship? Not in my
judgement.  At least SOME independent corroboration would be nice.

Chapter Two, on the role of the CIA in the atomic age.  Prouty discusses
Potsdam, the formation of the CIA, the nature of the 1947 Defense
reorganization, and a host of other matters.  Well-documented?  There are a
total of 3 footnotes, none of which are relevant to the meat of his
assertions, all three of which reference only peripheral items (one, a quote
of a speech by Dulles, another a quote offered out of context from an OSS
study written in April 1945 which Prouty claims Truman was not aware of and
did not see---a claim for which he offers no evidence and no background, only
his assertion; and the last cite is a passing reference to the notorious
"assassination manual" provided to the Nicaraguan Contras by the Reagan
Administration---which Prouty seems to offer as evidence of how evil the CIA
really is. Good scholarship? Well-documented? I don't think so. If you want to
see decent scholarship and documentation on these events, try John Raneleigh's
"The Agency: The Rise and Decline of the CIA," or Robert Donovan's excellent
two-volume history of the Truman administration.


To be continued in another message......

#: 318223 S7/JFK Debate  [POLITICS]
    04-Mar-95  17:47:36
Sb: #316952-Prouty's JFK
Fm: D.T. FUHRMANN 71301,527
To: Gerard McNally 73763,436

part 2 continued........


Chapter Three, on the covert, "invisible" war between the CIA and the
beleaguered (and presumably blameless---since Prouty ascribes the Cold War
belligerence almost exclusively to the pernicious machinations of the power
elite and their evil henchmen in the CIA---the role played by Moscow or
Peiping in the Cold War never sullies the picture) KGB is an improvement.
Prouty provides FIVE footnotes. One is another reference to Lewin's "Report
From Iron Mountain" (no indication this time that this is a work of total
fiction).  The other four are not references or courses, they are simply
asides offered by Prouty.  In his effort to smear the CIA, he asserts that CIA
control over the war in Vietnam from 1954 to 1965 when the marines landed cost
billions of dollars and 55,000 American lives.  That's not even close to
accurate in several respects, but it sounds good.  Good scholarship? Hardly.
Another is an aside about how after a visit by William Casey to the
Philippines in 1983, "we noted the rise of a new communist-inspired insurgency
there."  Except that anyone who had been studying SEA and/or the Philippines
during the late 70s and early 80s knew quite well that there was a
significant, communist-style insurgency in the Philippines.  Misleading at
best.

On page 37 of this chapter Prouty returns again to that shipment of arms from
Okinowa to Indochina in September 1945. This time it is stated as
incontrovertible fact, and Prouty now goes on to describe precisely what
happened to those weapons when they reached Haiphong harbor. Any sources,
references, or other supporting material? Nope. And his version stands alone
from virtually everything else to be found. The French also covered up and
never said anything about the massive infusion of arms and munitions to the
Viet Minh? Hardly credible, IMO.  They had no problem accussing us of all
sorts of other perfidy.

I can continue like this through the book.

On pages 84-85 we find a hint of what Prouty's real complaint is.  He despises
the civilian and political leadership because they rejected General Krulak's
(his boss and mentor's) "plan" for the war in Vietnam.  (Sometimes Prouty
almost sounds like he's on a crusade to have General Krulak sanctified.  I'd
be curious to know what General Krulak thinks about Prouty's claims.  Has he
ever spoken out on this publically (or privately that anyone knows of?)

Apparently concern about a nuclear war with Russia or becoming engaged in a
land war with China did not bother Krulak, and should not have bothered the
president of the US either.  That was a legitimate difference of opinion, but
in the final analysis it has to be the president's call.  The voters can let
their opinion be known in the next election.   But to me, Prouty's view is
clearly that of a military mind-set which only sees the military side of the
situation, and considers political factors as either irrelevant or obstacles.
Political leadership is something to be ignored or overcome. (Mind you, not
all military people are that way, and I know plenty of civilian-types who
think that military force is passe in the world.)

On page 122-123 Prouty suggests that Eisenhower never knew of or approved the
Bay of Pigs plans.  Unfortunately, that too does not match the historical
record. See, for example, Stephen Ambrose's "Eisenhower: The President," pages
637-640. Or Peter Wyden's "Bay of Pigs." (Which Prouty also mentions, but not
insofar as Wyden's version of events fails to conform with his own
interpretation of events). And rather than accept that Kennedy was the source
of the order rejecting direct US military intervention in the Bay of Pigs
(which is borne out in any number of sources, including Ambrose's
aforementioned book), Prouty works through all sorts of convolutions to pin
the blame on McGeorge Bundy (the plot needed thickening, and the inconvenient
problem of Kennedy's own actions needed to be explained away). Finally, of
course, Prouty dismisses anything Bundy and several others have said on the
subject with the simple statement: "None of these articles are completely
true. They all have a special scenario to build, and all are revisionist."  I
couldn't have described Prouty's own effort any more succinctly and concisely.

Let's move along.  On page 253 Prouty, discussing the Strategic Hamlet
Program, states: "Diem saw Strategic Hamlets as a means to institute basic
democracy in Vietnam, where nothing like that had existed before."   He
asserts that "Diem saw the institution of "basic democracy,"
"self-government," and "community law." On page 255 Prouty essentially argues
that the failures of the Diem regime were due to the "poor planning,
corruption, and alienation of the native, indigenous peasants." No hint that
it might have been the failings of the Diem regime itself. Sources? Not a
chance. Does this match the known historical record? Not really. Not even
close. Read the descriptions of the Diem regime and the Strategic Hamlet
Program in Halberstam's "Making of A Quagmire," or Ellen J. Hammer's "A Death
in November," or James W. Gibson's "The Perfect War: TechnoWar in VIetnam,"
pages 82-86, or George McT Kahin's "Intervention," or Francis Fitzgerald's
"Fire in the Lake."  Read the on-going cable traffic contained in "Foreign
Relations of the United States: Vietnam 1961-1963," 4 vols (USGPO). Not one of
them even coincides with much less confirms Prouty's description of events and
circumstances.  And again, the Vietnamese (north or south) have no role in any
of this, being complete puppets of the nefarious CIA high cabal to rule the
earth.

Prouty clearly states that the CIA decided to "get rid of" Diem and designated
specific individuals to meet with the ARVN generals in order to plan the coup.
He implies that the USG intitiated the contacts with the ARVN coup plotters,
when in fact it was the other way around. The coup plotters cautiously
approached the US, and it was the generals who asked that Conein be the
cut-out for any contacts.  And the clear implication is that the CIA is behind
this, the CIA is working against Kennedy's will.

On page 260 Prouty once again returns to the claim that the USG supplied the
Viet Minh in 1945, now simply stating it as a matter of incontrovertible fact.
Sources? We don' need no stinkin' sources.

Finally, on page 261, Prouty mentions the material contained in "Foreign
Relations of the United States: Vietnam 1961-1963." (Which, unlike John
Newman, he doesn't really use to support his arguments---in fact, there is not
one citation or reference to the documents contained in these volumes, despite
Prouty's assertion that the material is quite important). Prouty states this
material shows Kennedy was deeply involved in Vietnam planning and was
often"the driving force" and the "idea man" behind policy. He spends a great
deal of time on the Taylor-McNamara visit to SVN in September 1963, and the
resultant report. But he makes no effort to place that report in context, or
to provide any background to events in either Washington or Vietnam at the
time.  In Chapter 20 Prouty will categorically state: "There is no sign of any
plan by Kennedy for the series of policy alterations that began with the draft
of NSAM #273 on November 21, 1963, that, with significant revisions, Johnson
signed five days later." (page 313)   And if you download the file JFKLAO.TXT
from the library, you can read copies of the primary documents which show that
to be untrue as well.

Prouty then offers another of his unsubstantiated stories regarding how Diem
and Nhu were actually driven to Tan Son Nhut airport but failed to get on the
plane provided for them. Suffice it to say that this does not jibe with any
other account of events related to the coup, American, Vietnamese, or
neutral---and as usual, Prouty provides no sources or substantiation. We've
only got his word for this story. Good scholarship? Well-documented?

To be continued in part 3.......

#: 318224 S7/JFK Debate  [POLITICS]
    04-Mar-95  17:47:42
Sb: #316952-Prouty's JFK
Fm: D.T. FUHRMANN 71301,527
To: Gerard McNally 73763,436

part 3 continued.....


Here I offer what I consider to be the piece de resistance of Prouty's
scholarship. This is the assertion that precludes any further discussion and
answers any possible criticism or counter-argument to his claims. This is so
good, I feel it must be reproduced in full:

"In this book I have used various editions of the Pentagon Papers as reference
material [ed note: though you'll be hard-pressed to find any citations or
footnotes to that material in Prouty's book]. They are useful and they are
quite accurate AS FAR AS INDIVIDUAL DOCUMENTS GO [emphasis added], BUT THEY
ARE DANGEROUS IN THE HANDS OF THOSE WHO DO NOT HAVE THE EXPERIENCE OR OTHER
SOURCES REQUIRED TO VALIDATE AND BALANCE THEIR CONTENT." (Page 275).  In
short, Prouty has the necessary experience, and presumably the "other
sources," though he never tells us what they are); anyone who questions his
version of events probably doesn't.  So much for debate.  He's right.  And he
does it without even having to show on what it's based.  Good scholarship?
Well-documented? Credible?

Prouty raises questions about the November 20 Honolulu Conference, asking why
Kennedy would have needed any further debate on Vietnam and the direction of
US policy since he had issued NSAM 263 in early October 1963. Of course, what
had occured in the interim was the overthrow of the Diem regime.  I guess such
an event did not require some discussion and reconsideration of the direction
of US policy?   Although Prouty talks about the importance of these NSAMs, and
makes much of the alleged signficant differences in the two versions
(inaccurately, I might add), he never indicates where these documents are to
be found. (In fact, for everyone's convenience, I've uploaded copies to the
library of both along with some other relevant material under the file
JFK273.TXT.)

And then Prouty returns once again to that famous shipment of arms from
Okinowa to Ho Chi Minh, now stating categorically that "as we have seen, they
were given to Ho Chi Minh under the auspices of the OSS." I guess if one
repeats something often enough, it becomes fact. But the ONLY source for this
crucial and recurrent claim remains Prouty himself.  And he doesn't even claim
to have actually seen this stuff go to Ho Chi Minh.

Finally, with regard to Prouty's trip to McMurdo in the final weeks of 1963.
He implies that this was odd and not in keeping with his normal duties.  What
he fails to tell the reader is that he had already submitted his retirement
request some time before and was simply waiting around to be released from the
service (within a matter of weeks if not days).  As anyone who has been in the
military knows, when someone is at the end of a tour or has been debriefed
from their duties, they are often sent on all kinds of make-work jobs.
Sometimes these jobs are perks, and sometimes they can be rather onerous.  I
spent three months in Germany at the end of my tour there doing all kinds of
things totally unrelated to my previous duties---some of which required my
going on trips as an escort or driver. It seems Prouty was doing more or less
the same, though on a somewhat higher level.  OTOH, if one wants to think
seriously about his implication that he was removed far from the scene for
that critical assassination weekend, then one would have to ask who might want
him out of the office, and the obvious answer would be his revered boss,
General Krulak---who would have had both power and authority to send Mr.
Prouty on a wild goosechase. But that's another line of thought Prouty
wouldn't imagine pursuing.  He knows who the real enemy is, and he loses no
opportunity to let us know either.

Is this enough examples of why I have problems with Prouty?  Or should I go
through and provide some more?  I haven't even gotten to the period following
Kennedy's death.  Needless to say, I find most of his claims regarding the
planning for and process of escalation unconvincing---at the least.

dtf