Chairman STOKES. The committee calls Inspector Kelley. Sir, would you raise your right hand and be sworn?
Do you solemnly swear the testimony you will give before the committee is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?


Inspector KELLEY. I do.
Chairman STOKES. The Chair recognizes counsel for the committee, Leodis Matthews.
Mr. MATTHEWS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Kelley, at this time are you retired from the Secret Service?
Inspector KELLEY. Yes, in February 1978.
Mr. MATTHEWS. In 1963 you were a member of the Secret Service inspection detail?
Inspector KELLEY. Yes.
Mr. MATTHEWS. What were your duties and responsibilities?
Inspector KELLEY. The duties of the inspector from the Chiefs office at that time were to conduct the field investigations of the activities of the Secret Service both in the field, at headquarters, and on the protective details, to make periodic inspections of the offices.
Mr. MATTHEWS. Were you concerned about the performance of the agents in those investigations?
Inspector KELLEY. Yes, sir.
Mr. MATTHEWS. What type of inspection did you conduct of the agents' performance?
Inspector KELLEY. In the field office?
Inspector KELLEY. Their productivity, the manner in which they conducted their cases, the number of arrests, the kind of investigations they conducted, their relationship with outsiders, their relationship to their own people, and generally the conduct of the requirements of the job.
Mr. MATTHEWS. I want to call your attention to an exhibit, JFK F-423. Are you able to see the exhibit from where you are, Mr. Kelley?
Inspector KELLEy. Generally, yes I can.
Mr. MATTHEWS. This exhibit purports to be an organizational chart of the Secret Service as of November 13, 1964.
Inspector KELLEY. Yes, sir.
Mr. MATTHEWS. To your knowledge would that have been basically the same organization of the Secret Service in 1963?
Inspector KELLEY. Yes. [The above referred to exhibit follows:]


Mr. MATTHEWS. In your position as inspector would you report to the Director of the Secret Service?
Inspector KELLEY. Yes, sir, report to the Chief Inspector who reported to the Director or the Chief.
Mr. MATTHEWS. In the chart there is an indication about halfway down at the righthand side of the White House detail?
Inspector KELLEY. Yes, sir.
Mr. MATTHEWS. As an inspector, did you also have occasion to inspect the performance of the White House detail?
Inspector KELLEY. Yes, during an inspection of the White House detail we would review the performance of the detail.
Mr. MATTHEWS. What considerations would you give in evaluating their performance?
Inspector KELLEY. The general conduct of the people on the detail, the carrying out of their assignment, the connection they had with their superiors and their fellow agents.
Mr. MATTHEWS. Would you also have conducted performance reviews of the Protective Research Service?
Inspector KELLEY. Yes.
Mr. MATTHEWS. Did you focus on the quality of investigation by the field offices in the Protective Research Service, whether they complied with the guidelines and procedures of the Secret Service?
Inspector KELLEY. Yes, that was part of the inspection procedure.
Mr. MATTHEWS. I want to call your attention to November 22, 1963. At that time you were in Louisville, Ky.?
Inspector KELLEY. Yes, sir.
Mr. MATTHEWS. And you received a communique from Chief Rowley?
Inspector KELLEY. Yes, sir.
Mr. MATTHEWS. What were the contents of that message?
Inspector KELLEY. The chiefs office directed me to proceed toDallas, Tex., to assist Mr. Sorrels, the agent in charge of the Dallasoffice, to assist him in finding out what had happened at Dallas, what were the events surrounding the assassination, and to coordinate any investigation that might be conducted by the Secret Service concerning the assassination.
Mr. MATTHEWS. And you arrived in Dallas, Tex., that evening?
Inspector KELLEY. That evening.
Mr. MATTHEWS. Upon your arrival, did you understand that your responsibility was to conduct a criminal conspiracy investigation?
Inspector KELLEY. No. Actually, at that time it was to find out exactly what happened and what the role of the Secret Service had been in that tragedy there.
Mr. MATTHEWS. What were your first actions?
Inspector KELLEY. I first met with Mr. Sorrels and we went to the police department where Oswald was being interrogated. I sat in on, I think it was the second interrogation of Oswald.
Mr. MATTHEWS. Now in total you were present for at least four interviews with Lee Harvey Oswald?
Inspector KELLEY. Yes.
Mr. MATTHEWS. Why did you feel it was necessary to be there?
Inspector KELLEY. We were, of course, attempting to find out what had happened, whether he was the assassin, whether he had accomplices,whether there were other problems that the Secret Service might be facing in connection with assassination of other people. It was just generally to find out what had happened.
Mr. MATTHEWS. The Warren Commission has indicated that there were several people present at the time.
Inspector KELLEY. Yes. In my opinion, there were too many present at the time of the interrogation of Oswald. The interroga-
tion of Oswald by Captain Fritz of the Dallas Police Department was conducted under something less than ideal circumstances.
Mr. MATTHEWS. What effect would those circumstances have had upon the interrogation itself?
Inspector KELLEY. In my opinion, it made the interrogation of Oswald by Captain Fritz, who at that time had the primary jurisdiction of handling Oswald, made it very difficult for him to conduct the kind of interrogation that should have been conducted.
Mr. MATTHEWS. Did you engage in any conversation with Lee Harvey Oswald?
Inspector KELLEY. Yes, I did.
Mr. MATTHEWS. What was the nature of that conversation?
Inspector KELLEY. I had asked Oswald if he had assassinated the President. I told him who I was. I said that the Secret Service had the responsibility for protecting the President, that he was in custody accused of assassinating the President, and we wanted to know whether he had done it, and if he hadn't done it, to let us know; if he had done it, to admit it.
He indicated that he would talk to me later on.
Mr. MATTHEWS. Were you also present at the time Lee Harvey Oswald was shot.
Inspector KELLEY. I wasn't in the immediate vicinity. I was upstairs in the police office. We had just left Oswald in the police headquarters. The police took him down to the basement to transport him. Mr. Sorrels and I remained upstairs. When we heard that he had been shot, we immediately went down to the basement. Oswald was still in the basement. The ambulance had been backed in to take him to the hospital.
I attempted to enter the ambulance with Oswald to go to the hospital. I was prevented from getting into the ambulance by the Dallas policemen who got into the ambulance with him.
Mr. MATTHEWS. During the time between your first conversation with Lee Harvey Oswald and the time the shooting occurred, did you make any attempt to ascertain what his background had been?
Inspector KELLEY. Let me have the question again.
Mr. MATTHEWS. What investigation did you conduct into the background of Lee Harvey Oswald?
Inspector KELLEY. The investigation that the Secret Service conducted personally was, the interviews with Mrs. Oswald, with Marina. We had put a detail with Marina after Lee Harvey's assassination and we attempted to get as much background as we could on Oswald from her.
There was a great deal of information coming to us in the Dallas office at that time from the other agencies who had information on Oswald. The FBI had information on him. The agency apparently had some information on him and had furnished it to our headquarters.
The Dallas police had some information on him and the State Department had some information on him in connection with his trips to Russia. The military was supplying information to our headquarters and it was being provided to me at Dallas.
All of this information was coming down to Dallas to me.
Mr. MATTHEWS. Did you make any attempts personally to obtain information from the Secret Service files about Lee Harvey Oswald's background in connection with the Cuban organizations?
Inspector KELLEY. Well, the inquiry we made of the Secret Service files was whether the Secret Service had anything on Oswald prior to the assassination, and we had none.
Mr. MATTHEWS. Based upon your investigation in Dallas in the few days right after the assassination, did you develop a background in regard to Lee Harvey Oswald which you communicated to the field offices of the Secret Service?
Inspector KELLEY. Not an entire background. We were putting all the information together, but I don't know that we put it in any one document. It was in the series of documents that accompanied records we were preparing.
Mr. MATTHEWS. Mr. Kelley, when you were in Dallas conducting the investigation, were you the person in charge of the assassination investigation on behalf of the Secret Service?
Inspector KELLEY. Yes; in Dallas.
Mr. MATTHEWS. Did you request the field offices conduct investigations of suspects who they thought may have a connection with the assassination?
Inspector KELLEY. In connection with the assassination? No; I don't know that we sent any requests, that I sent any requests like that out. You must remember, that there was a coordinated investigation being conducted by the protective research section in Washington and our offices were furnishing us information that came to their attention from other agencies subsequent to the assassination and furnishing that to us at headquarters and to me in Dallas.
Mr. MATTHEWS. Did you request that the Chicago field office conduct an investigation in connection with the rifle found in the Texas School Book Depository?
Inspector KELLEY. Yes; I did.
Mr. MATTHEWS. Who did you talk with in the Chicago office?
Inspector KELLEY. I don't recall now who I talked to, but I talkedto someone in the Chicago office and asked them to run this lead out that we had.
Mr. MATTHEWS. Now, Mr. Kelley, you were aware of an investigation concerning special agents who were alleged to have been drinking the night before and the morning before the assassination?
Inspector KELLEY. I am aware of the inquiry; yes.
Mr. MATTHEWS. To your knowledge, were any of those agents found in violation of the Secret Service rules?
Inspector KELLEY. I don't think they were found in violation of any Secret Service rules warranting any action. It was an area of poor judgment, I presume, but there was no specific violation of any rule.
Of course, the inquiry indicated that their action the night before had nothing, no bearing, on what happened in Dallas.
Mr. MATTHEWS. Did you have occasion to review the performance of the agents at the time of the Kennedy assassination, the shooting episode in Dealey Plaza?
Inspector KELLEY. Yes; the agents that were in Dallas.
Mr. MATTHEWS. What conclusion did you reach with respect to their behavior?
Inspector KELLEY. Well, I felt that none of the agents could be charged with any dereliction of duty in connection with the assassination.
Mr. MATTHEWS. Did you have any conversation with the driver of the Presidential vehicle?
Inspector KELLEY. No; I did not.
Mr. MATTHEWS. Did you review his conduct?
Inspector KELLEY. I reviewed his conduct.
Mr. MATTHEWS. What did you understand his instructions were?
Inspector KELLEY. Well, his instructions were, to see that the car was driven safely, that the safety of his passengers was paramount, that he was to assure himself that the car was in condition to move properly, just to keep in mind the safety of the passengers.
Mr. MATTHEWS. Did he have any specific instructions that he was to take in anticipation of harm to the President?
Inspector KELLEY. The general instruction, to the agents in a situation where the President is considered to be in danger is to get the President out of there, to evacuate the President.
The Secret Service does not consider it necessary for the Secret Service to stand and fight in any situation. That our primary duty is the security of the President and to remove him from any dangerous situation.
So that generally the instructions to the drivers of the cars are to be prepared to get the President away from any dangerous situation.
Mr. MATTHEWS. Had the driver of the vehicle received any training in defensive driving or evasive driving?
Inspector KELLEY. Not in a formal sense. However, Mr. Greer who was driving the President's car at that time and the other agents who were assigned as drivers had long practice and history of driving the Presidential vehicles and the security vehicles.
Mr. MATTHEWS. Were there any tests available at the time to gage or measure the reactions of those persons who were responsible for the close physical protection of President Kennedy?
Inspector KELLEY. I presume there were tests available. I am not certain that any were given to the particular agents that were involved at the time of the assassination.
Mr. MATTHEWS. You reviewed their performance?
Inspector KELLEY. But I reviewed their performance?
Mr. MATTHEWS. You did review their performance?
Inspector KELLEY. I did review their performance.
Mr. MATTHEWS. Do you have a recollection that any such tests were available to give them?
Inspector KELLEY. I have no recollection that any tests were given.
Mr. MATTHEWS. Mr. Kelley, the special agent in charge of the White House detail testified before this committee that he had been removed from his position, that he had considered his conduct a demotion. Did you have occasion to review his performance?
Inspector KELLEY. Yes; that man, of course, was not at Dallas. I had occasion to review his performance at other times, but he was not present in Dallas.
Mr. MATTHEWS. Did you review his performance in connection with selecting agents to go to Dallas and making the arrangements for the trip?
Inspector KELLEY. Yes.
Mr. MATTHEWS. What, if any, conclusions did you draw with respect to his performance?
Inspector KELLEY. His performance was normal under those circumstances. The selection of agents was a rather routine performance at that time.
Mr. MATTHEWS. How long did you remain in Dallas?
Inspector KELLEY. I can't tell you the exact date, but I returned to Washington some time before December 15, probably the first week or 10 days of December.
Mr. MATTHEWS. Now in the week following the assassination, did you receive any reports from the field offices, reporting results of their investigation or whether there were any subjects, or other agents connected with the assassination?
Inspector KELLEY. Yes; we received several reports. At that time there were several rumors going around that Oswald had been seen in various places and Oswald had connections in various cities. And these reports were coming to us and being evaluated.
Mr. MATTHEWS. What was the nature of those reports generally? Did they identify any particular organization?
Inspector KELLEY. They were generally running out rumors concerning Oswald being seen with certain people in other cities. There was a report coming to us from New Orleans that Oswald had been seen in New Orleans, had been arrested in New Orleans, and had been participating in some pamphleteering activities in New Orleans.
Mr. MATTHEWS. You were aware during the time you were in Dallas that Lee Harvey Oswald had been a member of the FPCC, Fair Play for Cuba Committee?
Inspector KELLEY. That came out of New Orleans.
Mr. MATTHEWS. And you were also aware of the fact that one of the Secret Service agents had interviewed Marina Oswald shortly after the assassination?
Inspector KELLEY. Yes.
Mr. MATTHEWS. During the course of that interview she had indicated to him that she was a strong Castro supporter?
Inspector KELLEY. Yes.
Mr. MATTHEWS. Did you make any requests to any of the field offices to determine if there were any Cuban organizations or groups which had threatened, or presented a threat to, the President?
Inspector KELLEY. No, I didn't make any particular requests on that matter, but there were at that time, prior to the assassination, several investigations going on in the Secret Service office concerning groups that had in their rhetoric indicated that they were a danger to the President or had threatened the President or had been reported to threaten the President.
Mr. MATTHEWS. Mr. Kelley, I call your attention to a report that was written by a special agent in Chicago, a synopsis of which indicates that an informant advises that he had been in touch with a group of Chicago Cubans who may be involved in the assassination of the late President Kennedy.
Inspector KELLEY. Yes.
Mr. MATTHEWS. Can you state whether or not you were aware of that investigation while you were in Dallas?
Inspector KELLEY. Yes; I was.
Mr. MATTHEWS. Did you file a report in connection with that matter?
Inspector KELLEY. No; I didn't file any report that I recall. It was information coming to us.
Mr. MATTHEWS. Did you receive any other information that tended to support or corroborate that investigation?
Inspector KELLEY. Not that I recall.
Mr. MATTHEWS. Do you recall receiving any reports from the Miami area focusing in on an investigation connected with the Chicago investigation?
Inspector KELLEY. Yes, there were several reports coming out of the Miami area. The Secret Service had been very interested in the Cuban activity in the Florida area, the Miami area particularly, prior to the assassination because of the visits of President Kennedy to Miami and to his home in Florida.
We had frequent trips to Miami with our protectees. And we were concerned with the Cuban activities in Miami and we received several reports concerning them.
Mr. MATTHEWS. Do you recall receiving a report from a special agent in Miami, a Miami investigation, mentioning a person by the name of Quentin Pina Machado?
Inspector KELLEY. Yes, I did.
Mr. MATTHEWS. What was your recollection about that report?
Inspector KELLEY. That report was one of a series of reports that we received concerning the activities of the pro-Castro and antiCastro groups in Miami. He was alleged to be an activist, a radical and a dangerous man.
Mr. MATTHEWS. Mr. Kelley, I refer to JFK F-419, the report that I have discussed with you previously, a synopsis of which indicates that information had been received from an informant indicating that if the assassination of the President involved an international plot or conspiracy and that if there was evidence connecting Fidel Castro, the person who would have been responsible for carrying out any action on the part of Fidel would be Quentin Pina Machado, a Cuban terrorist used by Castro to carry out any Castro action.
Inspector KELLEY. Yes.
Mr. MATTHEWS. Did you make any determination to investigate the authenticity of that information?
Inspector KELLEY. We did not make a separate investigation by the Secret Service. This matter was under investigation by the FBI and by the agency. We were receiving information and exchanging information with the two agencies in connection with Machado and several other Cuban radicals in the Miami area.
Mr. MATTHEWS. Now with the exception of the memorandums you received from Miami, the memorandums you received from Chicago indicating the possibility of Cuban involvement in the assassination, was there any other evidence of a conspiracy that you were concerned with?
Inspector KELLEY. There were other memoranda coming and information coming into headquarters concerning the activities of other groups, some of whom had been alleged prior to the assassination as having an interest in the President, having threatened the President actually.
Mr. MATTHEWS. What type of groups would those have been, what affiliations?
Inspector KELLEY. These were some of the white rightist groups, the John Birch Society and the Ku Klux Klan, several of the right wing groups.
Mr. MATTHEWS. Did you read all the reports that the Secret Service generated in connection with your investigation?
Inspector KELLEY. Yes, I did.
Mr. MATTHEWS. Would you have been the only person reviewing those reports?
Inspector KELLEY. No, there were several people reviewing the reports; the Protective Research Division, Mr. Sorrels was reviewing some of them in Dallas, several people.
Mr. MATTHEWS. Did the Secret Service actively become involved in determining whether or not there was a conspiracy to assassinate President Kennedy soon after the assassination?
Inspector KELLEY. Yes. We were interested and we were certainly involved in attempting to answer that question.
Mr. MATTHEWS. Were there any restrictions on the scope of what areas you were to investigate?
Inspector KELLEY. The research that was done was done by the Protective Research Section in connection with what information we had and then asking for what information any other of the agencies had, the intelligence-gathering information.
The Secret Service was not in the business of gathering intelligence. We were in the business and are still in the business of evaluating the intelligence we receive.
So we were dependent and depending a great deal on the other intelligence agencies to furnish us information.
Mr. MATTHEWS. Now, the FBI was in Dallas at the same time conducting an investigation?
Inspector KELLEY. Yes.
Mr. MATTHEWS. At some point you received an indication that the FBI would conduct the conspiracy investigation?
Inspector KELLEY. Yes.
Mr. MATTHEWS. When was that?
Inspector KELLEY. That was shortly after I got down there, probably 2 or 3 days after I got down there. I received information from our headquarters that the Government had indicated that the FBI would be in charge of the investigation of the assassination.
Mr. MATTHEWS. As near as you can remember, what date would that have been?
Inspector KELLEY. I would say it would have been about the 24th or 25th. I really can't be certain after this length of time.
Mr. MATTHEWS. Did you make any effort to discuss with the FBI what areas that the investigation should focus on?
Inspector KELLEY. Not really. I had several discussions with Jim Malley who was my counterpart from the FBI in the Dallas office. There was an occasional question from Malley as to what we were doing in this area or that. We resolved those inquiries among ourselves.
I was there to see what had happened in connection with the Secret Service's responsibility, to see what this assassination meant to us in connection with our other protectees whether this was an ongoing conspiracy where President Johnson might be assassinated or some other Government official.
We were interested in that in those few days where there was a great deal of confusion as to what had happened.
Mr. MATTHEWS. Did you formulate any plan or course of investigation to determine whether, in fact, there was a conspiracy?
Inspector KELLEY. No, except the general plan to find out what happened, what went on.
Mr. MATTHEWS. What did you do with the information that you received from Chicago and Miami?
Inspector KELLEY. I merely read it and, of course, a copy of that information went to the protective research section who, of course, would evaluate it as to what it meant to us, along with myself.
Mr. MATTHEWS. What type of evaluation would they conduct? What were they trying to find out?
Inspector KELLEY. They would ascertain whether--their original request, of course, was to ascertain whether this had anything to do with the assassination in Dallas.
Mr. MATTHEWS. Did they have the responsibility of drawing connections between the various information that was coming in from the field office?
Inspector KELLEY. Yes.
Mr. MATTHEWS. And they were to apprise you of what connections, if any, there were?
Inspector KELLEY. Yes, and, of course, I was free to make my own judgment down there, too.
Mr. MATTHEWS. What person in the intelligence division did you talk with in connection with that?
Inspector KELLEY. Bob B-o-u-c-k.
Mr. MATTHEWS. And he was aware of all the reports that you had?
Inspector KELLEY. Yes.
Mr. MATTHEWS. Now how was your liaison process with the FBI working? Was there a free exchange of information?
Inspector KELLEY. At that time in Dallas?
Inspector KELLEY. Yes, I felt there was a free exchange of information. We were getting some information that was not available to them through our contacts with Marina. Of course, our agents were picking up information on the street as they do. People were coming to us at the local level in Dallas. I felt there was a free exchange of information. There certainly was between myself and Mr. Malley.
Mr. MATTHEWS. Now, when you were in Dallas, you received information from an Agent Patterson that he had talked with an FBI agent regarding some top secret information in regard to Lee Harvey Oswald?
Inspector KELLEY. Yes.
Mr. MATTHEWS. And he indicated to that agent that he could not tell him what the information was, but that it would be exchanged at the Washington level?
Inspector KELLEY. Yes.
Mr. MATTHEWS. Specifically, he mentioned the fact that the agent had had contact with Marina Oswald some 10 days before the assassination?
Inspector KELLEY. Yes.
Mr. MATTHEWS. And you later learned that that agent was James P. Hosty?
Inspector KELLEY. Yes.
Mr. MATTHEWS. Did you ever find out what top secret information he was referring to?
Inspector KELLEY. No, I didn't find out any top secret information he was referring to, but, of course, the information came to us shortly thereafter, perhaps at the same time, that the FBI had contacts with Oswald and had contact with Marina to find Oswald and to talk to him.
In discussing what this information was later, I think that it referred to the fact that Oswald had been in Russia.
Mr. MATTHEWS. Well, you say you think; did you ever discuss that with Inspector Malley?
Inspector KELLEY. No, I didn't.
Mr. MATTHEWS. Did you ever find that the agent who, in fact, had contact with Marina had been special agent James Hosty?
Inspector KELLEY. Yes, I learned that as a general piece of information, that Hosty was the control agent for Lee Harvey Oswald and that in that connection he had contacted Marina.
Mr. MATTHEWS. Did you ever learn about what has become known as the Hosty note?
Inspector KELLEY. No; that never came to my attention.
Mr. MATTHEWS. When did that first come to your attention?
Inspector KELLEY. I think I read that in the press a year or so ago or whenever it became public.
Mr. MATTHEWS. Now you were receiving information from the FBI in regard to Lee Harvey Oswald?
Inspector KELLEY. Yes.
Mr. MATTHEWS. And you learned that while Lee Harvey Oswald was in New Orleans he had contact with Carlos Bringuir, a member of the Cuban group known as the DRE?
Inspector KELLEY. Yes.
Mr. MATTHEWS. Did you send that information on to Mr. Bouck in the intelligence section?
Inspector KELLEY. Yes. Mr. Bouck got that information about the same time I did in the reports that came from New Orleans.
Mr. MATTHEWS. Was there ever anything developed from the Secret Service file in regard to whether there was an assassination attempt or plot involved?
Inspector KELLEY. A plot? Whether there was a plot involved in the assassination of President Kennedy?
Mr. MATTHEWS. Yes; based upon the Secret Service investigation after the assassination?
Inspector KELLEY. No; there was not.
Mr. MATTHEWS. Did you review all that information?
Inspector KELLEY. Yes, I did.
Mr. MATTHEWS. Now, Mr. Kelley, you have become aware of a September 7 speech given in 1963 by Fidel Castro at which time he indicated that he was aware of the CIA attempt to cause the Cuban leaders to be assassinated?
Inspector KELLEY. I have heard of it; yes.
Mr. MATTHEWS. And that he would respond in kind.
Inspector KELLEY. Yes.
Mr. MATTHEWS. Did you hear that? Did you know about that during the course of the Secret Service investigation in 1963?
Inspector KELLEY. I am not too sure when I became aware of that. I really don't know. I don't think so. I think this information was brought to my attention later after I had returned to Washington.
Mr. MATTHEWS. Would that have been a type of information that the Secret Service would be interested in.
Inspector KELLEY. Yes.
Mr. MATTHEWS [continuing]. For intelligence purposes?
Inspector KELLEY. Yes. It didn't come to my attention until later, since the thing happened before the assassination. It is not the sort of thing that would come directly to my attention anyway. It would come to the protective research section.
Mr. MATTHEWS. Now later when you returned to Washington, you became the liaison person with the Warren Commission?
Inspector KELLEY. Yes, sir.
Mr. MATTHEWS. Were you the principal person in the Secret Service responsible to the Warren Commission?
Inspector KELLEY. Yes.
Mr. MATTHEWS. What were your responsibilities?
Inspector KELLEY. I had a responsibility to assist the Warren Commission in any way we could, to furnish them any information we have in connection with the assassination, and to generally see that the Commission got everything it needed from the Secret Service.
Mr. MATTHEWS. Who would make the determination of which and what type of information was supplied to the Warren Commission?
Inspector KELLEY. That would come from--well, Mr. Rankin would request what information he wanted. I would make the determination as to what information I thought the Commission would want from it. But generally what happened was that if the Commission heard something from some other agency that perhaps they thought the Secret Service might have something on, they would ask us for it. If we had it, we would give it to them. If we didn't, we would tell them. When the Commission was formed, we sent up a great deal of documents, which included everything we had done in Dallas, all the information that had come to the Dallas office while I was there, all the reports and the statements made by the people which were involved. So it was one massive turning over to the Commission of everything that they thought they wanted at that time, and then subsequently, as their deliberations went on, they asked for other material.
Mr. MATTHEWS. Did you make any independent suggestions to the Warren Commission of what areas they should or ought to investigate?
Inspector KELLEY. Not really; no.
Mr. MATTHEWS. Did you discuss with them concepts of conspiracy?
Inspector KELLEY. Oh, yes, I have discussed with some of the staff the things that we had going at the time of the assassination, the kinds of threats we have.
Mr. MATTHEWS. You discussed with them the information that you have received from the field offices?
Inspector KELLEY. Yes.
Mr. MATTHEWS. And did you supply them all the reports in connection with that?
Inspector KELLEY. We supplied them with all the reports that we thought were pertinent to the assassination.
Mr. MATTHEWS. Now you also became involved in examining certain parts of the Secret Service operation and performance before the assassination with the Warren Commission?
Inspector KELLEY. Yes.
Mr. MATTHEWS. You considered, for instance, whether it was feasible to establish certain buildings on the motorcade route, if there is any more danger than others?
Inspector KELLEY. Yes, we furnished the Warren Commission with the kind of procedures we were going through at that time.
Mr. MATTHEWS. Now subsequent to that, you were involved in investigating and determining whether or not there were certain things on the motorcade route that should be particularly noted by the advance agents?
Inspector KELLEY. Yes.
Mr. MATTHEWS. You considered warehouses as being a building of particular concern?
Inspector KELLEY. Empty buildings, empty warehouses, or warehouses that were partially occupied, yes. Every building is a security risk, but there are certain types of buildings in which there is a lot less control than there are in others.
Mr. MATTHEWS. Now you also became aware of the threat made by Joseph Milteer?
Inspector KELLEY. Yes, I was aware of that investigation.
Mr. MATTHEWS. What was that investigation?
Inspector KELLEY. That was an investigation of members of the Ku Klux Klan and white rightists, wherein information had been received that one of the people had made a threat against the life of the President, against President Kennedy.
Mr. MATTHEWS. Do you specifically remember the nature of that threat? Was it that the President would be in the Miami area on November 18, and that it would be possible to assassinate him from a high building with a rifle?
Inspector KELLEY. Yes.
Mr. MATTHEWS. What, if anything, did the Secret Service do to respond to that?
Inspector KELLEY. These organizations that were involved, these people involved were continuing investigations that had been going on by the FBI, we exchanged information with the FBI as to where these people were, what they were doing, and there was just an attempt to evaluate this threat which was a similar threat, we had received others like it throughout the year, whether it really meant something that the Secret Service would have to take some action on, specific action on.
Mr. MATTHEWS. Now the threat was for November 18, 1963, and it was that there would be an attempt to assassinate the President from a high building with a rifle.
Inspector KELLEY. Yes.
Mr. MATTHEWS. Was there any effort made in Dallas to check any of the buildings?
Inspector KELLEY. Whatever effort was made was a request by the advance man with the Dallas police to see what they could do about a route survey.
Now in those days, the Secret Service's resources were extremely limited. We depended a great deal upon the local police departments for this type of backing and I don't know specifically what the Dallas police were asked to do or what they did on the survey route. I can recall what the advance report suggested they do.
Mr. MATTHEWS. When you reviewed the performance of the advance agents, did you give any special consideration to the Milteer threat, whether or not they knew about it?
Inspector KELLEY. The information coming at that time on a threat like that would go from the Protective Research Section to the White House detail. They were furnished with this kind of information. I can't say what they did with this particular piece of information.
Mr. MATTHEWS. Do you know whether the advance agents who went into Dallas were aware of that particular threat?
Inspector KELLEY. I don't know personally whether they were.
Mr. MATTHEWS. Now, Mr. Kelley, we have reviewed a series of reports that have been identified as JFK F-414, JFK F-415, JFK F-416, JFK F-417, JFK F-418, the caption of which reads Cuban Plot to Assassinate the President. The details of theinvestigation began in November of 1962 until August of 1963.
Inspector KELLEY. Yes.
Mr. MATTHEWS. Have you had occasion to review those reports?Inspector KELLEY. Yes, sir.
Mr. MATTHEWS. Would you give the committee a brief summary primarily of what those reports contain and what the investigation was?
Inspector KELLEY. This was an investigation of Cuban activity in the Miami area. It resulted from the interception of two letters to an address in Miami. The letters contained information of a threatening tenor to the President, against President Kennedy. I don't recall the exact text of the letters, but they were of sufficient importance to us to conduct an investigation and to ask information from the FBI and the agency as to what they knew about the particular people involved.
Mr. MATTHEWS. And the letters were mailed from where?
Inspector KELLEY. I don't recall. They were from outside the country.
Mr. MATTHEWS. Havana, Cuba?
Inspector KELLEY. From Cuba, yes.
Mr. MATTHEWS. According to the exhibit, the investigation established that the address and the person who mailed the letter was authentic.
Inspector KELLEY. Was what?
Mr. MATTHEWS. Was authentic.
Inspector KELLEY. The person who mailed the letter, the name was authentic, yes. However, there was an opinion by the intelligence people that these letters were perhaps sent to be intercepted. There was an indication by the intelligence analysts in our own shop and in the other agencies that perhaps the way these letters were addressed they were meant to be intercepted.
Mr. MATTHEWS. Now Quentin Pino Machado was mentioned as one of the persons involved in that investigation.
Inspector KELLEY. Yes, sir.
Mr. MATTHEWS. Was there ever any attempt made to connect this information to the later information you received about Quentin Machado?
Inspector KELLEY. Not by us, and I am not familiar with what followed in the investigation, mostly because we never made any connection between this investigation and this threat with the Oswald matter, with the assassination in Dallas.
Mr. MATTHEWS. Now during your time that you were with the Warren Commission, did you ever personally review this material in connection with the assassination investigation?
Inspector KELLEY. Yes, we sent some of this information up to the Warren Commission. They were aware of this investigation. Some of their staff people, of course, were in Miami and followed up something of that.
Mr. MATTHEWS. Mr. Chairman, I have no further questions at this time.
Mr. FITHIAN. At this time the Chair will recognize the gentleman from Tennessee, Mr. Ford, for such time as he may consume.
Following that, we will proceed to the 5-minute rule.
Mr. FORD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First, I want to ask counsel, Mr. Matthews, if copies of the different exhibits have been given to the witness, specifically JFK F-420, also JFK F-415, and JFK F-418.
Would you give that to the witness at this time?
Mr. MATTHEWS. Yes, Mr. Congressman.
Mr. FORD. We will get back to that in a few minutes, Mr. Kelley.
Mr. Kelley, your position as an inspector included evaluating the performance of the agents; is that correct?
Inspector KELLEY. Yes, sir.
Mr. FORD. Did you evaluate the reaction of agents in Dealey Plaza to the sound of gunfire?
Inspector KELLEY. Yes, I considered it and thought about it.
Mr. FORD. You thought about it?
Inspector KELLEY. Yes.
Mr. FORD. Governor Connally testified before this committee that as an experienced hunter, there was no question in his mind that the first sound was rifle fire. The evidence before this committee so far has indicated that in all probability the first shot missed. The medical and autopsy testimony has indicated that the third shot was definitely the fatal blow. We have had experts to establish that time between the first and the third shot was over 7 seconds.
I want to ask you, Mr. Kelley, what consideration did you give to the reaction between the first, second and third shot of the two agents riding the Presidential limousine? And also the agents immediately behind the limousine?
Inspector KELLEY. It is very difficult to second-guess what a person should have done in a crisis like that or just what he knew had happened. I think from talking to the agents, I don't think that any of them knew they were under fire until they saw the President so badly wounded.
The agents, of course, in the follow-up car were some distance away from the action. Their training and what their responsibility was, of course, was to look at the crowd. They were not looking at the President. Their instructions are that they ought to be looking away from him, to see what was going on.
The two people in the car, of course, were facing the other way. I don't think any of them realized at the time the first shot went off that they were under fire. We had a parade situation with motorcycles alongside of you, the crowd cheering, people making a great deal of noise, as is usual in a political motorcade of that type, and in summary, I just don't think the agents knew they were under fire until much too late to do anything about it.
Mr. FORD. Yes, but what training did the agents receive?
Inspector KELLEY. Well, the training, the agent had extensivetraining as to how to handle a crowd and how to attempt to keep themselves, between danger and the President's body. They have a great deal more training now than they had then, but even in those days there was specific training procedures that the agents went through, the recognition of gunfire, a very difficult problem for anyone I think in those situations.
Mr. FORD. Mr. Kelley, Mr. Maurice Martineau, the special agent in charge of the Chicago field office, testified before this committee that before the assassination, the field offices did not call on other Federal agencies for assistance.
Would you tell us why, the Secret Service never contacted law enforcement agencies for assistance in those areas where threats had been received, for instance, Dallas, Miami of other areas?
Inspector KELLEY. Well, we could call on any of the local police agencies for assistance and not only could but did. There was some restriction on us about calling on FBI agents for physical protection, to assist in the physical protection of the President. We had access to any government agency for information, for intelligence information. We were not prohibited from calling on other Federal agencies, if we considered it necessary. We could get assistance and bodies. It was not easy but it could be done if we had a situation where we thought we needed them.
Mr. FORD. Well, Mr. Martineau said in his testimony: "I think it was a matter that tragically and unfortunately took an assassination to bring it into sharp focus the need for further steps which the Secret Service previously did not authorize." My question: During your tenure with the Secret Service, did you find that to be true before the assassination?
Inspector KELLEY. I think that the Secret Service did not have all the resources it needed to conduct this important protective responsibility. We were shorthanded. We did not have the number and kinds of people and training that this serious responsibility called for.
Mr. FORD. Mr. Kelley, soon after you arrived in Dallas, you requested that the Chicago office determine whether Alex Hidell had purchased a rifle from the Klein's Sporting Goods Store; is that correct?
Inspector KELLEY. Yes, sir.
Mr. FORD. If you will recall, when the Secret Service agents arrived, FBI agents had already been there; is that correct?
Inspector KELLEY. Yes, sir.
Mr. FORD. And in fact instructed the manager not to talk to anyone else; is that correct?
Inspector KELLEY. Yes, sir.
Mr. FORD. Were the Secret Service and the FBI investigating the case independently, and, what, if any, attempts did you make to prevent this duplication of investigation?
Inspector KELLEY. No, I don't think we were investigating the matter independently. I think at that time, in those very early days of the investigation, we were attempting to investigate it jointly. The rifle had been identified as having been used, the alcohol and tobacco people had identified it as having been purchased in Chicago by Oswald using his alias of Hidell. We got that information and I just sent it out to Chicago to ask that it be verified. The Bureau apparently had the same information a little earlier than we had and did the same thing.
I saw no problems with the duplication of effort in the first few days of Dallas. There was a great deal of confusion going on. We just did what we thought we had to do to get the information that we were trying to seek as to what was happening, what the assassination meant to us in our protective efforts.
Mr. FORD. Were you in contact with the FBI---
Inspector KELLEY. Yes.
Mr. FORD [continuing]. During this period?
Inspector KELLEY. Yes.
Mr. FORD. Were there any recommendations, Mr. Kelley, to the Warren Commission that they focus upon the conspiracies which the Secret Service at one time were concerned about?
Inspector KELLEY. I don't think there had been a special focusing on any one particular activity that we were doing. I think they focused on the entire range of possibilities.
Mr. FORD. Were you aware that there were significant questions of Oswald's connection and association with Castro's government and the Cuban groups in the United States during this investigation?
Inspector KELLEY. Yes, well, we were aware of Oswald's trip to Mexico. It became known to us after the assassination. We were aware of his activities in Dallas with the Fair Play for Cuba Committee. We received no indication of any link with Oswald with organized radical groups among the Cubans except the Fair Play for Cuba Committee.
Mr. FORD. But you did have information of his involvement with the pro-Castro----
Inspector KELLEY. Yes, sir.
Mr. FORD. Is that correct?
Inspector KELLEY. Yes, sir.
Mr. FORD. What reasons did you have for not thoroughly reviewing all the files in the Secret Service to supply the Warren Commission with any reference that would assist the Commission in the investigation, Mr. Kelley?
Inspector KELLEY. Oh, I think we supplied the Warren Commission with anything that was pertinent to the assassination, anything they asked for, and anything that we, in our opinion, thought would be interesting to them. We held nothing back from the Warren Commission that I know of. It was my job to see that we didn't, and I don't think we did.
Mr. FORD. When the FBI began to focus its investigation on Lee Harvey Oswald, did you gain any impression that the conspiracy investigations conducted by the Secret Service was being ignored at that time?
Inspector KELLEY. No, no, sir.
Mr. FORD. Were you aware of what other information was?
Inspector KELLEY. I was aware of the information we had, I was also aware that much of the information contained in our files concerning these Cuban activities was coming from the Bureau, and there was a free exchange of information between the Bureau and ourselves in Miami and at headquarters concerning these alleged plots.
Mr. FORD. Mr. Kelley, there was a group of Secret Service personnel who reviewed the assassination investigation conducted by the various field offices of the Secret Service; is that correct?Inspector KELLEY. Yes, in the Protective Research Section.
Mr. FORD. Who were the people in that group, Mr. Kelley?
Inspector KELLEY. There were people in the Protective Research Section and some others who were brought in from the field who had been in the protective research area, and of course I was involved in it.
Mr. FORD. During the meetings, did you ever discuss whether there were any credible investigations to be done in the conspiracy area?
Inspector KELLEY. In connection with the Oswald matter?
Mr. FORD. The Oswald what?
Inspector KELLEY. In connection with the assassination, you mean, or generally in the threat area?
Mr. FORD. Well, in connection with the assassination, prior to the assassination, or the assassination itself---
Inspector KELLEY. Prior to the assassination it would have been done by the Protective Research Section, by Mr. Bouck, who has discussed these matters with the head of the White House detail, with the Deputy Director, the Deputy Chief at the time, and the Chief of the Secret Service concerning important, what we considered important plots that came to our attention, either came to our
attention directly or perhaps came to our attention through the FBI or the agency.
Mr. FORD. Did this group determine what files should or should not be given to the Warren Commission?
Inspector KELLEY. No, I think the decision as to what files should be given to the Warren Commission was pretty well handled by myself.
Mr. FORD. Were any recommendations given to the Warren Commission?
Inspector KELLEY. Recommendations by the Secret Service?
Mr. FORD. No, by this group, from this group we are discussing.Inspector KELLEY. No.
Mr. FORD. As far as conspiracy?
Inspector KELLEY. No, we made no recommendation to the Warren Commission.
Mr. FORD. No recommendation?
Inspector KELLEY. No. We merely supplied them with information we had.
Mr. FORD. Mr. Kelley, the agent in charge of the intelligence function for the Secret Service testified before this committee that he had no knowledge of the substance of Fidel Castro's September 7, 1963, speech in which Castro voiced what had been interpreted as a direct threat to the Kennedys.
What consideration was this threat given in deciding to investigate any persons who were strong pro-Castro supporters?
Inspector KELLEY. I don't think any consideration was given to investigating pro-Castro supporters. With the resources we had at that time, we were pretty well confining ourselves to threats made against the President. Domestic security was the responsibility of the Bureau.
Mr. FORD. Did it occur to you at that time to investigate all pro-Castro persons that would have been in the Secret Service intelligence files?
Inspector KELLEY. If they were in the Secret Service intelligence files, of course they did get a periodic review.
Mr. FORD. They did?
Inspector KELLEY. They got a periodic review as the matters in the Protective Research Section were reviewed.
Mr. FORD. I mean during, right after the assassination of President Kennedy?
Inspector KELLEY. Right after that, all the information we had in the Protective Research Section was pretty thoroughly reviewed. We were looking for some information that we had that might go back to Oswald.
Mr. FORD. When the FBI took control of the assassination after December 9 I think you said, you mentioned earlier that you were contacted through a White House order, did you release all of that information at that time to the FBI, including the intelligence files?
Inspector KELLEY. No, we didn't release it to them. The information, we reviewed the information, and the information we had on the Cuban conspiracies and the Cuban groups we found was all information that the FBI had. As a result of the assassination and the review, we received a great deal more information that the Bureau had on these groups than we had had heretofore which the Bureau previously did not think that we were concerned with.
Mr. FORD. But do you recall whether you went through the files to investigate all of the pro-Castro persons immediately after the assassination?
Inspector KELLEY. Not for the purpose of investigation, merely for the purpose of whether we had them, how many we had and that had any relationship to Oswald.
Mr. FORD. Would Castro's statement together with Marina's statement to the Secret Service agent, shortly after the assassination, have strongly indicated that such persons should have been investigated?
Inspector KELLEY. Not by the Secret Service, we don't feel. The Secret Service out of necessity, because of their resources, confined themselves to direct threats that we had received.
Mr. FORD. Mr. Kelley, Quentin Machado was known to the Secret Service even before John F. Kennedy's assassination--
Inspector KELLEY. Yes, sir.
Mr. FORD. [continuing]. As being an associate of a person who had threatened the President and was investigated as part of a Cuban plot to assassinate President Kennedy?
Inspector KELLEY. Yes, sir.
Mr. FORD. Yet all of the information in the Secret Service files were not supplied to the Warren Commission stating this?
Inspector KELLEY. No, that isn't quite true, Mr. Congressman. In the first group of reports that we sent to the Warren Commission, a report on Quentin Machado was sent to the Warren Commission. That report had a file number on it reflecting that there was a great deal more information in the Secret Service files on this particular situation. We have, since this matter came up with us in the investigation, we have been attempting to ascertain whether this group of papers, which is F-415, ever went to the commission, and we cannot say that it did or did not, but we can definitely say that the report on Quentin Pino Machado containing the same file number as this information did go to the commission, so the commission had access to this file and had access to the information.
I also know that the commission, did an intensive inquiry concerning the activities of the Cubans in the Miami area, which involved this investigation.
Mr. FORD. Mr. Kelley, let me get to my real question here. I am concerned. Were you of the opinion that the Warren Commission was open to the possibility of the conspiracy?
Inspector KELLEY. Yes.
Mr. FORD. Did you consider this information pertinent and relevant to their inquiry during this time?
Inspector KELLEY. Yes.
Mr. FORD. Mr. Kelley, I have just a few other questions here. I would like to call your attention to JFK F-415 through F-418. Do you have it there?
Inspector KELLEY. I have F-415 and F-416.
Mr. FORD. As I understand it, these reports contain information regarding the Secret Service's investigation into a Cuban plot to assassinate President Kennedy; is that correct?
Inspector KELLEY. Yes, sir.
Mr. FORD. The Secret Service was aware of this information during the course of the Warren Commission; is that correct?
Inspector KELLEY. Yes, sir.
Mr. FORD. But never actually gave the commission these reports during their investigation; is that correct?
Inspector KELLEY. Not these particular reports, but we did give the Warren Commission information concerning these plots, and it was the Secret Service Report No. 206 that we sent to the commission, and it is in the commission file, mentioning Quentin Machado, containing the file number under which these reports are filed.
Mr. FORD. At the time, Mr. Kelley, were these reports considered by the Secret Service to be secret documents?
Inspector KELLEY. They were so classified, yes.
Mr. FORD. Sir?
Inspector KELLEY. They were classified as secret.
Mr. FORD. Is that a rationale for not giving them to the Warren Commission?
Inspector KELLEY. No. We gave other secret documents to the Warren Commission. That wasn't the rationale why they were not given. As a matter of fact, I don't have it before me, but I think the memorandum we also gave to the Warren Commission was classified.
Mr. FORD. You know earlier, it might have been when Mr. Matthews was talking with you, you mentioned that you were to supply them with relevant and pertinent reports.
Did you consider the investigation of this plot a concern of the work of the Warren Commission?
Inspector KELLEY. Not really. In hindsight and with what happened during the Warren Commission recommendation there, in my opinion this investigation that was conducted in Miami had no relationship to the Oswald assassination. It was, however, one of the things that the Warren Commission was reviewing, Oswald's connection with pro-Castro groups, and I just feel that this information was available to the Warren Commission; that so much of it came from other agencies that they probably had the same information from the Bureau and the CIA in connection with it. It may very well have been that some of the staff people in the Warren Commission came and reviewed these reports that we had since they had a referenced file number, knowing that we had information on these plots. But our records do not show that we transmitted these to the Warren Commission.
Mr. FORD. But you are saying that you reported to them a file number; is that correct?
Inspector KELLEY. Yes.
Mr. FORD. Would there have been anything in the reports you provided to the Warren Commission which would have given them a clue as to what information the number might have referred to as a file number?
Inspector KELLEY. Yes, I think the memorandum we sent to them, Memorandum 206 that we sent to them, would have supplied that information.
Mr. FORD. It would have?
Inspector KELLEY. It would have.
Mr. FORD. The FPCC, Mr. Kelley, or the Fair Play for Cuba Committee, is mentioned in the reports, and a member of that organization is alleged to be a part of the plot to kill the President.
Would there have been anything in the files and reports you provided the commission to indicate the presence of this group in that investigation?
Inspector KELLEY. Not in the report, not in the particular two-page report we sent to them in connection with this case. That report dealt mostly with Machado.
Mr. FORD. The two-page report?
Inspector KELLEY. I referred that we did send to the commission in this area.
Mr. FORD. And the Warren Commission had the two-page report? Inspector KELLEY. Yes.
Mr. FORD. Let me ask you this: Were you aware at the time that LeeHarvey Oswald had been a member of the same organization in the New Orleans area, the pro--anti-Castro-----
Inspector KELLEY. Subsequent to the assassination?
Mr. FORD. Yes.
Inspector KELLEY. Yes, we learned of that subsequent to the assassination. We didn't have anything on Lee Harvey Oswald prior to the assassination.
Mr. FORD. Mr. Chairman, I have no further questions.
Chairman STOKES. The time of the gentleman has expired.
Mr. Kelley, earlier today counsel for the committee Matthewsasked you about the conduct of the Secret Service prior to the assassination. Relative to that, he asked you whether they had broken any rules or regulations of the Secret Service, and your answer was that they had not.
Knowing, however, of their conduct on the previous evening, was it ever evaluated in terms of performance?
Inspector KELLEY. We would have preferred that they had stayed away from the places they were at. We would have preferred they had gone to bed earlier. But in the whole review of what had happened, there was no indication that that activity the night before had any effect on their performance the next day or that it had any effect on the assassination that happened.
Chairman STOKES. Well, have you ever had a chance to review the Zapruder film?
Inspector KELLEY. The Zapruder film? Yes, sir.
Chairman STOKES. And referring back to the question posed to you by Congressman Ford with reference to reaction time, did you study the film from the viewpoint of whether the reaction time the of agents was in accordance with what you felt would be top performance?
Inspector KELLEY. Yes, Mr. Chairman, and it was reviewed, we reviewed it very thoroughly with the agents who were involved. The motorcade was moving. You can recall in the Zapruder film the very great difficulty Clint Hill had in even reaching the car to assist Mrs. Kennedy, and the agents were just not able to get up to that car in time.
Chairman STOKES. When you review the film, you can clearly see the reaction that Governor Connally had, with reference to the first shot.
What reaction do you see in terms of the Secret Service agents?
Inspector KELLEY. Well, in the film, of course, there is no apparent action that is being taken by Mr. Kellerman, who is in the front seat. The driver at that time apparently was unaware of anything that happened, apparently through the concentration of his responsibility of driving the car, and there is no apparent reaction on the part of the agents.
Chairman STOKES. But doesn't your investigation reveal that in the Vice Presidential car there is a reaction on the part of Agent Youngblood immediately?
Inspector KELLEY. When the caravan in the motorcade begins to move out, there is, when it was apparent that the motorcade had been fired on, and it was apparent that the motorcade had been hit, and the motorcade begins to move out from the area is when there is the reaction.
Chairman STOKES. Well, the apparent real first reaction we see on the part of agents then is at the point where someone says "Let's get out of here."
Inspector KELLEY. "Let's get out of here." That was Mr. Kellerman's instructions to the driver, "Let's get out."
Chairman STOKES. That is only after the third shot.
Inspector KELLEY. Yes.
Chairman STOKES. What did your investigation reveal in terms of the activities of the agents the night before?
Inspector KELLEY. The night before?
Chairman STOKES. Yes, sir.
Inspector KELLEY. It is a long time ago. This was an after-hours club where they had apparently--where drinks could be served. It was also a place, the only place open at the time in the area where the agents could go and have something to eat, and they went to this place for that purpose.
Chairman STOKES. Do you recall what place you are talking about?
Inspector KELLEY. I beg your pardon?
Chairman STOKES. Do you recall what place you are talking of?Inspector KELLEY. No, I don't recall it.
Chairman STOKES. How late were these agents about, that night?
Inspector KELLEY. I am sorry, Mr. Congressman. I don't recall. It was late in the morning. It was after midnight.
Chairman STOKES. Can you tell us how late after midnight?
Inspector KELLEY. No, I am sorry I can't. I don't recall the details of that investigation. It was done by another inspector. Although I reviewed it, my memory on it isn't that good now.
Chairman STOKES. Would the time 2 a.m. refresh your recollection?
Inspector KELLEY. It was in that area, yes, sir.
Chairman STOKES. So that we understand, so far as you are concerned, with all that you know about their activities the previous evening, in terms of relating it to their performance the following day, you don't find that it in any way affected their performance?
Inspector KELLEY. No, sir.
Chairman STOKES. Now one other question: I am not an expert in security, but it would seem to me that common sense would dictate that high buildings would afford an assassin a greater opportunity than a lower spot, if I were planning an assassination.
Can you tell me to what degree the Secret Service covered the high buildings in the area or made any kind of investigation as to whether or not this could afford someone the kind of opportunity that was afforded that day?
Inspector KELLEY. At that time, in that time period?
Chairman STOKES. Yes, sir.
Inspector KELLEY. The Secret Service had to depend upon the local authorities to assist them in this kind of a route survey. We have a parade route. There are hundreds of buildings and thousands of windows that a parade route goes down in a political situation as it was in Dallas. It is usual to go to the police and find out what buildings along the route are not occupied and then who occupied them.
If possible, the police put somebody at the particular buildings that perhaps are not occupied. Then they ask for the cooperation of the people who occupy the buildings to look out for strangers and to see that the people who are asked to get into the buildings are people that are known to them. That is about the extent of the route survey that could be conducted in those days.
A building like the Depository, the same thing would apply, that you would go to the manager and ask him to be concerned about strangers coming into the building. There would be no, for instance, review of every employee in the building to find out who he was.
Chairman STOKES. You don't place any agents in those buildings or anything of that sort?
Inspector KELLEY. We do now, depending upon our resources, or police are asked to do it. But in those days there weren't that many people available.
Chairman STOKES. DO you do it now as a result of the fact that it occurred then?
Inspector KELLEY. Well, we do it now because we have the resources to do it. The Congress has given us the resources to do it. We do it now whenever we can.
Chairman STOKES. Thank you. My time has expired. The gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Devine.
Mr. DEVINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Inspector Kelley, you served how many years in the Secret Service before you retired?
Inspector KELLEY. I came in in July of 1942.
Mr. DEVINE. You retired when?
Inspector KELLEY. February 28 of this year.
Mr. DEVINE. You were a special agent in charge of the Philadelphia office and an inspector at the time of your resignation?
Inspector KELLEY. No, sir, I was the Assistant Director for the Protective Forces at the time of my retirement.
Mr. DEVINE. But you were an inspector at the time of the assassination?
Inspector KELLEY. Yes, sir.
Mr. DEVINE. One of the mandates of this select committee is, after having conducted the investigation hearing, to make recommendations to the Congress. You will recall that at the time of the assassination the offense apparently was against the peace and dignity of the State of Texas and not a matter necessarily of Federal jurisdiction.
Do you in your capacity as a long time Secret Service employee have any suggestions or recommendations as it relates to an offense of this nature?
Inspector KELLEY. Well, as you know, that deficiency has been taken care of by the Congress. It is now a Federal crime to assassinate the President, that is S: 1751, title 18 U.S.C. Hopefully, it will never happen again, but if it does, the jurisdictional lines have been a lot better drawn now.
Mr. DEVINE. Yes. Well, again, at that time it was an offense against the laws of the State of Texas and the FBI intervened at the specific direction of the then President Lyndon Johnson?
Inspector KELLEY. Yes, sir.
Mr. DEVINE. I guess the degree of cooperation then between your agency and the Bureau was satisfactory, was it not?
Inspector KELLEY. Yes, sir.
Mr. DEVINE. And your primary responsibility was to protect the life of the President and the President's family?
Inspector KELLEY. Yes, sir.
Mr. DEVINE. Who makes the decision prior to a motorcade on whether or not the motorcade route will be publicized? Is that by the Secret Service or---
Inspector KELLEY. Usually it is by the staff.
Mr. DEVINE. Whose staff?.
Inspector KELLEY. The President's staff.
Mr. DEVINE. The Presidential staff?
Inspector KELLEY. Yes.
Mr. DEVINE. Does the Secret Service have the right of veto of that decision?
Inspector KELLEY. We have the right to suggest that perhaps it is not a good idea or that we have no problem with it. Usually in these areas where there is a political connotation to the motorcade the route will be published and usually has to be published.
As a matter of fact, there is activity to get a crowd out so it has to be published.
Mr. DEVINE. Apparently the Secret Service was not overly concerned in this instance, but had you received information that the President's life was in danger, did you have an absolute right of veto of publicizing a motorcade route or canceling a motorcade?
Inspector KELLEY. We have no legal right to veto them, but with the cooperation we have with the staff and the rapport that we had with the President's staff, if we had a serious consideration that the President's life was in danger, I feel sure we can persuade the President's staff to accept our recommendation.
Mr. DEVINE. You in response to a question from Congressman Ford said that on that date and at that time that the Secret Service was "shorthanded," that you did not have the resources available that were needed. Now why was this, because of lack of funds, lack of personnel, or poor planning?
Inspector KELLEY. Well, we like to think it was merely the lack of funds. The ability to do many of the things that we have now was not present at that time. We didn't have the numbers of people to do the proper route surveys. We didn't have the number of people to access and evaluate the kinds of information we should have been getting. There just was not enough people to do the job.
Mr. DEVINE. I think you said you felt it was probably due to lack of funds?
Inspector KELLEY. Yes.
Mr. DEVINE. Of course, it is easy for this select committee and everyone else to second-guess a situation like this and I think we all recognize that it is just totally impossible and impractical to expect that any agency such as the Secret Service or any other can totally guarantee that they can protect the life of a President when he is exposed to large crowds in a downtown area; isn't that accurate?
Inspector KELLEY. That is true, Mr. Devine.
Yes, sir.
Mr. DEVINE. I have no further questions.
Chairman STOKES. The time of the gentleman has expired. The gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Preyer.
Mr. PREYER. I have no questions, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman STOKES. The gentleman from Indiana, Mr. Fithian.
Mr. FITHIAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Inspector, I wanted to pursue additionally Mr. Devine's line of questioning.
Now, taking advantage of your 36 years of experience and the fact that the assassination of President Kennedy was not the last nor the most recent attempt on the life of a President, we have the example recently of President Ford and others. What can be done in your estimation, if you were writing the law, what can be done legislatively to improve the protection of the President of the United States?
Inspector KELLEY. Legislatively, I am not too sure I have the answer to that, Mr. Fithian. We have been, of course, supported by the Congress ever since the 1963 incident. We have additional resources now. The requests for resources that we get are now being handled. Mr. Devine suggests, you know, another pile of money isn't going to do it.
In the kind of society we have and the kind of contact that our President and the other people that we protect have with the public, it is very difficult to isolate them from the public. And, of course, the contacts with the public is where the danger lies, as we saw with Mr. Ford. There are an awful lot of disturbed people on the streets that I don't think we can do very much about.
Mr. FITHIAN. Some have suggested that the requirement be put into the law that in motorcades such as this that you have to have a bubbletop vehicle or something of that nature. Others have said that the President speaking from a podium, the crowd of people that have not been prescreened or selected, that some kind of glass shield be a requirement.
Realizing that you cannot insulate and totally remove the danger, are there things that you would recommend if you didn't have to satisfy anybody else and your job was to safeguard the President of the United States and you wrote all the rules and regulations for that? Do you have any recommendations to make to this panel?
Inspector KELLEY. Strictly on security grounds, of course, the riding of the President or a dignitary in an open car down a parade route is a very dangerous procedure. Walking along a fence at an airport shaking hands with a campaign crowd is a dangerous procedure. There may be someone in the crowd who thought he would never get a chance to get that close to the President, but when he finds he is that close, he does something to him.
The people who have assassinated Presidents of the United States have a characteristic running through them. They are all these loners, these people who have a grudge, with a mental history. Oswald fit that category exactly. The closest thing we had to a political assassination was, of course, the attack on Blair House, but there, again, the people that attacked it had mental problems.
The isolation of the President in our society I just don't think is feasible. If he is going to do a parade route for a political purpose, he wants to be seen and, of course, this was the objection you get by some of the protectees with the people standing around him, the agents who surround him.
You get complaints about that that they come out to see the President and all they can see is a group of agents standing around, they never get to see the President, either in a standing situation or in a motorcade.
The cars are equipped to give him that kind of protection, to furnish him that shield between himself and the crowd, but frequently we were not able to use them.
Mr. FITHIAN. It could be made a law, though, that that is the only car. That is just the way you build the car, I suppose.
Inspector KELLEY. Yes, that is the way we build the car.
Mr. FITHIAN. I mean, it could be made a law that the bubbletop, the glass protection is required. Would you recommend that?
Inspector KELLEY. On strictly security grounds I would recommend it. I have very little faith that that could be or would be provided to the President or that the President would accept it. Of course, he would accept it if it was the law, but not that he would want it.
Mr. FITHIAN. One other question: Do you have any recommendations to make as to ways to improve the coordination between the law enforcement and security personnel, not only the Secret Service and the FBI but the Secret Service and local police departments?
Do you have any recommendations in that area?
Inspector KELLEY. The Warren Commission made some recommendations concerning the kinds of information that the Secret Service should ask these organizations to furnish them. We, of course, were and are in the business of protection. These people are in the business of gathering intelligence. They made recommendations that we followed.
And I think the arrangements we have with the local and the Federal agencies who are assisting us in this gathering of intelligence are first rate. There is, of course, in the last number of years, and I was--I had some experience with it in the last 2 years of my years with the Secret Service since I was in charge of the Protective Forces, and that is in the kind and the amount of intelligence that we are now getting from the intelligence-gathering agencies, the guidelines to the Bureau, for instance, concerning the kinds of activities they will engage in now in connection with radical groups has cut down tremendously the flow of information we have from the Bureau about groups.
There has been a very significant decline in the amount of information we receive since those guidelines. They are having problems with the Freedom of Information Act, they are having problems with the Privacy Act, as to just what kinds of information they can collect.
It has cut down considerably the amount of information available to the Secret Service for evaluation, it is our job, not their job, to evaluate this information and how it affects the safety of the President.
Chairman STOKES. The time of the gentleman has expired. The gentleman from Connecticut, Mr. McKinney.
Mr. McKINNEY. Mr. Kelley, I was riding in a Presidential limousine in Hartford, Conn. with President Ford when we were hit by a car. I am sure you read about it, everybody did.
A Hartford policeman just simply forgot to block off a street. If you look at this picture over here, you see the President's limousine wide open and the only protection on either side is a policeman on a motorcycle, the very same situation we encountered in Hartford.
Do you feel that the Secret Service should be given more men and more equipment and should they be doing the side running rather than the local police in a community?
Inspector KELLEY. No, I don't think, Mr. McKinney, that would solve too many problems. I think the kinds of activities that the police engage in everyday are not the kinds of activities that the Secret Service engage in and that it is not necessary for us to have our own motorcycle people, our own crowd control people.
The uniformed presence, of course, in a crowd is a great deterrent. Trying to quantify what prevention does is, of course, very difficult. We don't know how many assassins we have discouraged by the fact that we have people around the President or whether if we didn't have any around him, whether it would make a difference.
So I think the resources we have been given when we requested them have been adequate for it.
Mr. MCKINNEY. I would agree with you. I guess they are great at that. But when they are not standing in front of a green light, they are not too good. The bubbletop was not bulletproof, as I understand it it was simply plexiglass.
Inspector KELLEY. At that time, that is right.
Mr. MCKINNEY. But there is a possibility that it could have deflected the bullet or a possibility that the smashing of the bubbletop by a bullet would have brought about a faster reaction. Who made the decision whether or not that top was going to be
Inspector KELLEY. I am not the best witness on that I think. I think Mr. Rowley will appear before you later and I think perhaps he is the best witness on that.
I have heard various interpretations of why. Of course, what you say is perfectly true, if we had a bubbletop there would have been some obfuscation of the assassin's view. It is a deterrent.
Mr. McKINNEY. The other question I would ask is: Even though the bubbletop was not on, I assume it had to be there in case it rained so it could be put on in speedy notice?
Inspector KELLEY. Yes, it was in the back of the car.
Mr. McKINNEY. Since the bubbletop was not on, why was no one assigned to riding the back of that car? It seems that two men standing on the back of the car holding on to those hand grips would not have obstructed the view of the President from either side of the parade, but they certainly would have obstructed the assassin's clear line into the rear of the car.
Inspector KELLEY. Well, the information 1 was given on that subject was the President didn't want them there.
Mr. McKINNEY. OK, that is all the questions I have.
Chairman STOKES. The time of the gentleman has expired. The gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Edgar.
Mr. EDGAR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Kelley, I notice from some briefing materials that we have in our booklets that you were present during several interviews by Captain Will Fritz of Lee Harvey Oswald; is that correct?
Inspector KELLEY. Yes, sir.
Mr. EDGAR. Can you indicate for us why none of those interviews were taped?
Inspector KELLEY. The Dallas police didn't have a tape recorder and I didn't have one with me, and apparently no one else had one. They didn't have a tape recorder for Captain Fritz anyway.
Mr. EDGAR. Wouldn't it have been a logical thing in 1963 for--
Inspector KELLEY. Yes.
Mr. EDGAR [continuing]. For an investigative person like yourself from the Secret Service to demand or request or require a tape recorder be present when interrogating such a sensitive witness?
Inspector KELLEY. Well, I didn't feel when I was allowed to come into the interrogation room that I had the right to insist on a recordation of it. I was there as a guest of the Dallas Police Department and Captain Fritz was handling it.
On hindsight, I should have wired myself before I went in there. But it was just my own position that I did not think I should insist on a recording of it.
Mr. EDGAR. You used the phrase "you didn't think you were allowed", or you were given permission to go in and listen in on the interview. Was there a breakdown in lines and chains of command that made you feel as though you didn't have full or equal opportunity with the captain of the Dallas Police Department to interrogate this witness?
Inspector KELLEY. No, there was certainly no lack of cooperation between the Dallas Police Department and ourselves and Captain Fritz and me. As a matter of fact, when we first went in to do the interviews, I didn't know whether they had a recording or not. I guess I just assumed they had, but I did find out later that the interview was not being recorded.
Mr. EDGAR. In your conversation with Lee Harvey Oswald, what did he say to you?
Inspector KELLEY. He indicated to me that he was a Communist but not a Marxist. The only other things he talked to me about, or I talked to him about, was the fact that he had been accused by the police department as being the assassin and we were concerned about whether he was or whether there was somebody else that assassinated President Kennedy and I would like to talk to him about it, and he indicated, I will talk to you later.
Mr. EDGAR. Did he indicate to you at that time that you were the first Secret Service agent to talk with him?
Inspector KELLEY. No; I don't recall that conversation with him.
Mr. EDGAR. Had he encountered any other Secret Service agents prior to your conversation with him?
Inspector KELLEY. No; he hadn't.
Mr. EDGAR. In his alleged leaving of the Texas Book Depository, did he run into any agents at all?
Inspector KELLEY. No; he did not. We didn't have any agents there.
Mr. EDGAR. It also indicates in our briefing material that you were placed in charge of the protective detail around the Oswald family; is that correct?
Inspector KELLEY. Well, I was not in charge of it. I formed it. I selected the people and supervised it.
Mr. EDGAR. Did you ever have occasion to talk with Marina Oswald?
Inspector KELLEY. Yes; I had several discussions with her.
Mr. EDGAR. And that was through a Russian-speaking Secret Service interpreter?
Inspector KELLEY. Yes; Agent Gopadze.
Mr. EDGAR. What were your impressions of Marina Oswald in the few days and weeks after the assassination?
Inspector KELLEY. My impression of her was that she was terribly frightened that something would happen to her, either that the U.S. Government was going to do something to her or that people would. She was frightened of being assaulted and attacked.
Mr. EDGAR. Did she indicate to you who she was frightened of specifically?
Inspector KELLEY. Well, the government, the U.S. Government would retaliate against her.
Mr. EDGAR. Did she indicate whether that was the CIA, the FBI, the Secret Service, the Dallas Police Department?
Inspector KELLEY. She didn't indicate specifically anybody. She did not get along with the FBI agents that had previously contacted her.
Mr. EDGAR. I have a great many additional questions in that area, but because of the time, let me just ask one final question: When we were putting together the Select Committee on Assassinations after its rocky history, one of the first things that we did under our new chief counsel was put together an investigative plan for both the deaths of President Kennedy and Dr. Martin Luther King.
Was there at any time a sit-down discussion with the FBI, the Secret Service, and/or including the Dallas Police Department, of an investigative plan along the lines of, gentlemen and ladies, let's sit down and decide where we go from here in investigating each of the aspects of this tragic assassination?
Inspector KELLEY. No; not to my knowledge, and I certainly did not participate in any such plan. I did have several discussions with Mr. Malley as to what we were doing and why we were doing it, the kinds of things we were interested in and the kinds of things that were coming to our attention, either from the streets in Dallas or from our field offices.
Mr. EDGAR. As a non-policeman and a non-lawyer and someone who comes to this kind of experience in kind of a new way, it seems to me that that was an oversight on the part of the investigative agencies or that that was not a practice---
Chairman STOKES. The time of the gentleman has expired, but the Chair will let the witness answer. You may proceed.
Inspector KELLEY. The order had come down that the FBI would take full responsibility for the investigation of the assassination, so there was really no problem then concerning ourselves and the FBI.
The Dallas Police Department also understood that their role in the investigation of Kennedy's assassination had been taken over by the Bureau.
Chairman STOKES. The time of the gentleman has expired.
Mr. EDGAR. Thank you.
Chairman STOKES. The gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Sawyer.
Mr. SAWYER. Yes.
Did, at that time, the Secret Service have specific contingency plans, like the military does, on hypothetical things happening, a specific plan to be put into effect by the agents on the scene?
Inspector KELLEY. Well, the specific plan, of course, in all the protective procedures was that if something untoward happened in a protective situation, the only plan was to get the protectee out of there, out of the dangerous situation.
Mr. SAWYER. Was there any specific plan of how to do that that was laid out in advance?
Inspector KELLEY. Yes; the agents, of course, were to surround the President if he was in a vehicle. The vehicle was to be moved out directly regardless of convoys or motorcycle and to merely remove the President from the dangerous area.
Mr. SAWYER. Is it presently just as vague as that or do they lay out specifics? On a parade route, let's say, if things happen, where they go, what they do, and with how they get there?
Inspector KELLEY. It is much more improved now and there are practice runs of what to do in a specific area of attack.
Mr. SAWYER. So that the agents know specifically if they are in a certain area of a parade route where they are going to go and how they get there?
Inspector KELLEY. Exactly.
Mr. SAWYER. They didn't do that then?
Inspector KELLEY. Well, it was not a practice to practice these situations in getting out of them. There was a lot less sophistica- tion in those days as to how to handle an emergency than there is today. Mostly because of resources.
Mr. SAWYER. I presume, then, at that time that individual agents didn't know specifically what they, themselves, were supposed to do and where they were supposed to take a position or this kind of thing?
Inspector KELLEY. Oh no. I think the positions in a parade and the positions of who will stand where when the car stops or what each agent will do when the car is moving is spelled out and was spelled out at that time.
Mr. SAWYER. I see. I don't mean that there was no arrangement made for this sort of thing, but it was a lot less sophisticated than it is today and the agents did not have the opportunity to practice in those situations that they have today.
Also, along the line of the questioning of Chairman Stokes, I, too, was impressed in watching the Zapruder film at how rapidly Governor Connally reacted to that first shot and all through the series of three shots there was no visible reaction by any of the agents that were in the pictures.
Do they receive any training in recognizing by sounds the sound of rifle shots or pistol shots?
Inspector KELLEY. They do now. They receive formal training in it. In those days, the young agents that were on the detail, the trained agents that were on it, all had a great deal of physical attributes. There was no formal training in the recognition of shots before that.
Mr. SAWYER. There is now?
Inspector KELLEY. Agents are always qualified with pistols. They were qualified with their firearms and the use of shoulder arms, but there was no specific training on the recognition of pistol shots or rifle shots.
Mr. SAWYER. What also surprised me about that reaction by Governor Connally and the nonreaction by the agents through that time frame of say 7 or 8 seconds is that the agents, I would think, would be alert for exactly that kind of thing, be concentrating on it much as a sprinter might concentrate on listening to the starting gun, whereas Governor Connally would have had other things on his mind.
And yet their reaction, for being there for that real purpose, is surprising, their total lack of reaction to it for such a long time frame.
Inspector KELLEY. Mr. Congressman, you know, Governor Connally was hit with a bullet.
Mr. SAWYER. Not at that first shot. He turned to see where the shot came from and testified here and it is perfectly obvious in the picture that he recognized this rifle shot and spotted pretty much where it came from and he was hit by the next shot.
Well, anyway, aside from that, one other thing that impressed me when I was in Dallas and looking at this was the so-called grassy knoll location, that we were told no one had either checked out or even stationed as much as a Dallas policeman there.
If you are familiar with that situation, the fence runs along the top of the grassy knoll, a solid fence with trees overhanging, and there is nothing behind it at all but a big, unoccupied gravel parking lot and railroad tracks and a perfect escape situation.
Apparently, it was somewhat of a hangout for bums since there are wine bottles and everything else laying around back there.
I am just amazed that the Secret Service would not have been alert to that kind of a situation because you could have killed the President from there with a handgun.
Inspector KELLEY. Well, along that parade route, from the airport there were a number of those same hazardous situations on a parade route of that length. There were, of course, some police in the area. There was nobody on the grassy knoll. There were some police in the area of Dealey Plaza as it went into the underpass.
Mr. SAWYER. Today would the Secret Service check out places like that and insist that there be some policeman behind that fence or somebody to cover that kind of a situation?
Inspector KELLEY. Yes, we do a great deal more of that than we did before.
Mr. SAWYER. Thank you. I have no further questions.
Chairman STOKES. The time of the gentleman has expired. The gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Devine.
Mr. DEVINE. Mr. Kelley, I just have one question: Do you feel that the Secret Service and/or the FBI failed in its pre-assassination investigation?
Inspector KELLEY. No, Mr. Devine. When you look at the background of Lee Harvey Oswald, a number of government agencies had information on him. No one government agency had it all and the Secret Service had none.
However, if we had, if we knew the totality of his background and if we knew that he was working in the bookstore at that time, I feel that the Secret Service would have done something to insure that we knew what Lee Harvey Oswald was doing at the time of the parade. We would have seen that he was at work or we would have seen what he was doing in the bookstore if we knew the totality of it.
He turned out to be the kind, as I say, of the typical assassin, the typical assassin of Presidents, a loner, a man with a history of mental problems, a bitter man, a man who felt himself a failure.
In talking to Marina, he was a very disturbed man. To predict human behavior to that extent, I think was just an impossibility. We have a great many people in this country who have these same tendencies who never turn out to be assassins. I think the ability to predict that kind of human behavior is still beyond us.
Mr. DEVINE. So it gets right back, then, to the impossibility to totally protect any President isn't that right?
Inspector KELLEY. Yes.
Mr. DEVINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman STOKES. The time of the gentleman has expired. Mr. Kelley, at the conclusion of a witness' testimony before this committee the witness is entitled to 5 minutes in which he may comment upon or explain or in any way amplify or expand upon the testimony he has given before this committee. On behalf of the committee, at this time I extend to you 5 minutes for that purpose if you so desire.
Inspector KELLEY. Just a minute Mr. Chairman, to expand on some of the discussion we had with Mr. Edgar as to the kinds of information we are now getting or not getting from the intelligence agencies that are responsible for the gathering of intelligence.
We have found, or I have found just before I retired, a very serious declination in the number of reports we get from the Bureau and the kind of reports that we get from the Bureau that I think we should have. We got after the Warren Commission's recommendation up until 1974. We have had a great many of them and they are failing off predictably every month.
Chairman STOKES. Thank you very much, Mr. Kelley. We appreciate your appearance here. At this time you are excused.
Inspector KELLEY. Thank you.
Chairman STOKES. The committee will recess for the noon hour and we will therefore have recess until 2 p.m. this afternoon.
[Whereupon, at 12:24 p.m. the committee recessed, to reconvene at 2 p.m.]